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LICENSING FACIALLY RELIGIOUS
GOVERNMENT SPEECH: SUMMUM'S IMPACT
ON THE FREE SPEECH AND
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
ScoTT W. GAYLORD*
ABSTRACT
It is the rare case that is decided solely on Free Speech
grounds yet directly impacts the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Pleasant Grove City v. Summurn is such a
case. Although all nine Justices concurred in the judgment-that a
privately donated monument in a public park is a form of
"government speech" that is not subject to scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause-the case spawned five different opinions as the
Justices attempted to explain the effect of the Court's decision on
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. This Article analyzes
the interaction between Sumrnum's "recently minted" government
speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause. In particular, with
respect to the Free Speech Clause, I argue that Summum resolves
an ongoing circuit split regarding a common medium of
expression-specialty license plates. Recently, six circuits have
reached at least three different conclusions with respect to the
status of specialty license plates, and two other circuits have
addressed the First Amendment issue in passing. In addition, a
petition for writ of certiorari has been submitted seeking Supreme
Court review of a 2008 Seventh Circuit case dealing with this very
issue. I maintain that Summum's new test for government speech is
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inconsistent with the test that the majority of circuits has applied to
specialty plates. Whereas the majority considers whether a
reasonable observer would identify the government as the speaker,
Summum focuses on the level of control that the government has
over the specialty plate program. Under Summum's "control" test,
many (and possibly all) specialty plate programs-as well as many
other forms of speech that are subject to government control-
government speech and, therefore, exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny.
Moreover, I contend that Summum's control test necessarily
alters the Court's analysis of facially religious government speech
under the Establishment Clause. Although the Establishment
Clause still applies to government speech, the endorsement test
does not. To understand why, this Article explores the effect of the
government speech doctrine on an issue of first impression - a
specialty license plate containing the phrase "I Believe" and a
picture of a cross superimposed on a stained glass window.
Although the lower court concluded that the plate violated the
endorsement test, Summum changes the analysis. Under Summum,
the government has the right to say what it wants even though the
government's intended message may differ significantly from the
message that observers ascribe to the government. As a result,
when dealing with government speech, Justice O'Connor's
"reasonable observer" test focuses on the wrong party-the
reasonable observer instead of the government speaker. That is,
when determining whether facially religious government speech
violates the Establishment Clause post-Summum, the Court must
determine whether the government actually has an improper
religious motive, not whether a reasonable person interprets the
message as impermissibly religious. I conclude that a majority of
the current Court is apt to apply the control test and hold that the
"I Believe" specialty plate is constitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2009, the United States Supreme Court decided
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,' which marks an important
development in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
Although all nine Justices concurred in the judgment-that a
privately donated monument in a public park is a form of
"government speech" that is not subject to scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause-the case spawned five different opinions as various
Justices attempted to explain the proper scope of the Court's
decision on the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. With
respect to the Free Speech Clause, for the first time, the Court
unanimously adopted and applied the government speech doctrine,
building on the framework set out in its prior decision in Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass'n.2 While several members of the Court
claimed that Sumrnmum's effect would be limited, the majority
opinion carved out a potentially broad category of government
speech, immunizing from Free Speech review any message over
which the government has effective control. But, as several
concurring Justices acknowledge, Summum's reach is not limited to
the Free Speech Clause. Given that the government could reject a
facially religious monument donated by the Summum religion while
continuing to display a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments, Summum also directly implicates the relationship
1. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
2. 544 U.S. 550 (2005). In Johanns, the Court considered a First
Amendment challenge to a government-compelled subsidy that was used to
fund government speech regarding beef and beef products. Id. at 556-57.
Specifically, pursuant to the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, a one
dollar per head assessment on cattle was used to fund, among other things,
promotional campaigns-such as "Beef. It's What's for Dinner"-that were
designed by an Operating Committee and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture. Id. at 553-54. Although compelled speech generally is
prohibited, see W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley
v. Maynard. 430 U.S. 705 (1977), "'[c]ompelled support of government'- even
those programs of government one does not approve-is of course perfectly
constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest." Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559.
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between "the recently minted government speech doctrine"3 and
the Establishment Clause.
Summum, therefore, is significant for at least three reasons.
First, it provides the Court's latest and most detailed explanation of
the government speech doctrine. Federal and state governments
are expansive and provide numerous services to their constituents.
As the federal and state governments continue to expand their
reach (consider the federal government's recent involvement in the
financial sector, automobile industry, and healthcare), the
opportunities for government speech continue to increase. Thus,
given that government speech is widespread and is a protected
category under Summum, it is critical to understand the proper
scope of the government speech doctrine.
Second, Summum applies directly to an ongoing circuit split
regarding a common medium of expression-specialty license
plates. Given that Wooley v. Maynard4 is a staple in Constitutional
Law classes across the United States, it is not surprising to hear that
automobile license plates implicate the First Amendment. In
Wooley, the United States Supreme Court held that New
Hampshire could not punish a vehicle owner for covering up the
state motto on its standard, state-issued license plate. But, as
indicated by the considerable attention that specialty license plates
have received in recent years,' specialty plates vary in significant
3. Summum. 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (challenging a New Hampshire law which made
obscuring the "Live Free or Die" motto on license plates illegal).
5. See, e.g., Jeremy T. Berry, Comment, Licensing A Choice.: "Choose
Life" Specialty License Plates and Their Constitutional Implications, 51
EMORY L.J. 1605, 1624-30 (2002) (assessing the forum analysis for specialty
plates): Caroline Mala Corbin. Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private
and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 619-623 (2008) (surveying specialty
plate cases and suggesting a better analysis for mixed speech); Traci Daffer, A
License to Choose Or A Plate-ful of Controversy? Analysis of the "Choose
Life" Plate Debate, 75 UMKC L. REV. 869, 870 (2007) (analyzing cases that
deal with license plates supporting pro-life organizations and viewpoints); Jack
Guggenheim & Jed Silversmith, Confederate License Plates at the
Constitutional Crossroads: Vanity Plates, Special Registration Organization
Plates, Bumper Stickers, Viewpoints, Vulgarity, and the First Amendment, 54
U. MIAMI L. REV. 563, 577-79 (2000) (arguing that specialty plates should be
considered a limited public forum while vanity plates should be a nonpublic
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ways from the compelled speech in Wooley. All states offer a large
and ever-increasing selection of specialty plates. For example,
state-issued license plates relate to specific organizations, groups, or
causes.6 Under most specialty license plate programs, the state
creates the specialty license plate program through legislation and
then retains some level of control over the design and wording of
specialty plates.' Individuals who so desire may choose a specific
specialty plate and display it on their vehicles. Thus, unlike the
standard license plate in Wooley, motorists may select from a
variety of specialty plates (usually paying more for the opportunity
to do so) that carry a message with which they (presumably) agree
and which they wish to convey to the rest of the world.
But who is speaking through, and therefore responsible for,
this expressive activity-the government or the individual who
chooses to display the message? Recently, six circuits have reached
at least three different answers to this question," and two other
forum); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying
Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 618-622 (2008) (applying a
recommended framework for distinguishing between private and government
speech in the specialty license plate context).
6. Each of the fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, has specialty license plate programs. See
ANNE TEIGAN & NICHOLAS FARBER, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, TRANSPORTATION REVIEW: MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION
AND LICENSE PLATES, 22-25 (2007), http://www.ncsi.org/print/transportation/
Iicense-registration07.pdf. Although the number of specialty plates offered
varies by jurisdiction, currently there are more than 4,300 specialty plates
available across the country, and the number appears likely to continue to
increase. License Plate Information, National Conference of State
Legislatures, Sept. 2009, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18456 (last
visited Feb. 20, 20t0) (listing jurisdictions and number of approved specialty
plates for each).
7. See Guggenheim & Silversmith, supra note 5, at 564-67 (discussing
creation of specialty plates in various states).
8. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding specialty
plates were private speech, not government speech); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v.
Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that while specialty plates have
some government speech quality, they are primarily private speech); Choose
Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that specialty
plates implicated private rights and were not government speech); ACLU of
Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that under Johanns,
319
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
circuits have addressed the First Amendment issue in passing.9
Moreover, a petition for writ of certiorari was submitted to the
Court in a 2008 Seventh Circuit case asking the Court to consider
this very issue."' And Summum speaks directly to this conflict. In
particular, Summum provides an analytical framework that is
inconsistent with how the majority of circuits has resolved the status
of specialty plates. Whereas the majority view determines whether
specialty license plates are private or government speech by
considering whether a reasonable observer would identify the
government as the speaker, an approach consistent with Summum
would focus on the level of control that the government has over
the specialty plate program. Thus, Summum is significant because
its new "control" test governs public monuments, specialty plates,
and presumably all other forms of government speech.
Third, although Summum is expressly limited to the speech
claims raised by the Summum religion, the Court's decision is likely
to alter the Court's already complex Establishment Clause
Tennessee's "Choose Life" specialty plate is government speech); Henderson
v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case because of the Tax Injunction Act); Planned Parenthood of S.C.,
Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding "Choose Life" specialty
plate is a mixture of private and government speech).
9. Children First Found., Inc. v. Martinez, 169 F. App'x 639 (2d Cir.
2006) (declining application of the government speech doctrine because
"custom license plates involve, at minimum, some private speech"); Women's
Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 945 n.9 (11th Cir. 2003) ("We fail
to divine sufficient government attachment to the messages on Florida
specialty license plates to permit a determination that the messages represent
government speech.").
10. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No.
08-1283, 2009 WL 1030528, at *1-8, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009)
(discussing development of "Choose Life" controversy and collecting cases
regarding that Circuit's decision upholding Illinois's denial of a "Choose Life"
specialty plate). Florida was the first state to approve a "Choose Life"
specialty plate. See Daffer, supra note 5, at 871-72. Since that time, twenty-
four states have approved "Choose Life" plates, while fourteen other states
are considering proposals for such plates. See Choose Life, Inc.,
http://www.choose-life.org/states.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). Two
states-Hawaii and Montana-have approved "pro-choice" specialty plates,
and six other states are considering proposals for similar "pro-choice" plates.
See Daffer, supra note 5, at 891-92.
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jurisprudence." As Justice Souter noted in his concurrence, "[t]he
interaction between the 'government speech doctrine' and
Establishment Clause principles has not, however, begun to be
worked out.' 2  But Summum requires courts to confront this
interaction head on when considering facially religious government
speech. If, as the Court states in Summum, the government "is
entitled to say what it wishes," may it engage in religious speech? 3
For example, consider the impact of Summum on an issue of first
impression-a specialty license plate with the phrase "I Believe" on
the plate along with a picture of a cross superimposed on a stained
glass window. 14  In December 2008, a district court enjoined
production of the "I Believe" specialty plate on Establishment
Clause grounds, noting that neither of the parties had "directed the
court to any case addressing the constitutionality of legislatively-
authorized (or administratively-approved) religious license
plates."' 5  But the district court entered the injunction before
Summum was decided. As a result, Summers v. Adams provides a
unique opportunity to begin "working out" the intersection of the
Free Speech and Establishment Clause strands of the First
Amendment in light of the Court's holding in Summum -with an
eye toward determining whether and to what extent the
government speech doctrine affects the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
The purposes of this Article, therefore, are threefold: (i) to
evaluate the scope of Summum's government speech doctrine, (ii)
to consider how the government speech doctrine affects a circuit
split regarding the status of specialty license plates, and (iii) to
11. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that "our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In the past we have attempted to
justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause jurisprudence on the ground
that it 'sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility."').
12. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009)
(Souter, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 1131 (majority opinion) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
14. Summers v. Adams, No. 3:08-2265-CMC, 2008 WL 5401537, at *1
(D.S.C. Dec. 23, 2008).
15. Id. at *12.
consider whether Summum alters the Court's Establishment Clause
analysis when the government engages in facially religious speech,
such as the "f Believe" specialty plate in South Carolina.
Toward these ends, the next section provides an overview of
the Summum decision, setting out the history behind the case as
well as the Court's analysis of the government speech doctrine.
Having defined the contours of the government speech doctrine
under Summum, the third section considers the impact of Summum
on the circuit split over the status of specialty license plates. In
particular, this section explains the reasons for the circuit split and
focuses specifically on the recent case from South Carolina in which
the district court enjoined the production and distribution of the "I
Believe" license plate. This section concludes with an analysis of
why specialty license plates in South Carolina and the majority of
jurisdictions are a form of government speech under Summum and,
therefore, are not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.
The fourth section then turns to consider how Summum's control
test alters the Court's Establishment Clause analysis of facially
religious government speech, using the "I Believe" specialty plate
as a case study. Specifically, I argue that the government speech
doctrine precludes the application of the endorsement test to
facially religious government speech. That is, because government
speech is characterized by the government's complete control over
the message conveyed, which may differ from the message that
observers ascribe to the government, Justice O'Connor's
"reasonable observer" test 6 focuses on the wrong party-the
reasonable observer instead of the government speaker. Although
the Establishment Clause still applies, the endorsement test does
not. Thus, I contend (i) that after Summum and Johanns, the
central Establishment Clause inquiry with respect to facially
religious government speech is whether the government has a
primarily religious purpose and (ii) that there is good reason to
suppose that the "I Believe" plate is constitutional under both the
Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
16. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630-36 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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I. SUMMUM- A MONUMENT TO THE PERMANENCE OF THE
GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Background.
In 1971, the Fraternal Order of Eagles donated a Ten
Commandments monument to Pleasant Grove City ("the City").
The City displayed the Ten Commandments monument in Pioneer
Park, a 2.5-acre public park located in the City's historic district.
7
By 2003, Pioneer Park contained fifteen permanent displays, most
of which came from private donors.' 8 Unlike Stone v. Graham,
McCreary County v. ACLU, and Van Orden v. Perry, though,
Summum does not involve an Establishment Clause challenge to
the display of the Ten Commandments in a public setting. ' Rather,
Summum involves a claim that the City violated the Free Speech
Clause by refusing to accept and display another monument, one
donated by members of the Summum religion. In 2003, Summum's
president wrote two letters to the City asking for permission to
build a monument in Pioneer Park containing the Seven Aphorisms
of Summum,' which would be similar in size and design to the Ten
17. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
18. Id.
19. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that
the display of the Ten Commandments in a Kentucky courthouse, even
though accompanied by other displays, was unconstitutional because the
government had an improper religious purpose); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677 (2005) (a plurality of the Court and Justice Breyer held that a Ten
Commandments monument on the Texas Capitol grounds did not violate the
Establishment Clause); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that the
display of the Ten Commandments in a public school violated the
Establishment Clause).
20. According to the brief that Summum filed with the Court, the Seven
Aphorisms ."were inscribed on the original tablets handed down by God to
Moses on Mount Sinai .... Because Moses believed that the Israelites were
not ready to receive the Aphorisms, he shared them only with a select group
of people. In the Summum Exodus account, Moses then destroyed the
original tablets, traveled back to Mount Sinai, and returned with a second set
of tablets containing the Ten Commandments."' Summum. 129 S. Ct. at 1129-
30 n.1 (quoting Brief for Respondent 1-2).
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Commandments monument. The City refused both requests,
stating that its practice was "to limit monuments in the Park to
those that 'either (1) directly relate to the history of Pleasant
Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the
Pleasant Grove community."' 2  Pursuant to this policy, Pioneer
Park's displays included, among other things, an historic granary, a
wishing well, the fire station, a September 11 monument, and the
aforementioned Ten Commandments monument.2 2
In 2005, after the Pleasant Grove City Council rejected
another request to erect a Seven Aphorisms monument in Pioneer
Park, Summum filed its action. Summum alleged that the City and
other local officials violated the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment by permitting one religiously themed monument (Ten
Commandments) to be displayed in the Park while denying another
(Seven Aphorisms). 23  Although the district court denied
Summum's request for a preliminary injunction, the Tenth Circuit
24reversed. Specifically, the panel held that Pioneer Park was a
public forum and that, as a result, the City could refuse to display
the Seven Aphorisms monument only if the City had a compelling
reason that was narrowly tailored.2' Because the City was unlikely
to survive this strict scrutiny review, the panel directed the City to
permit Summum to construct its Seven Aphorisms monument in
Pioneer Park. After the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for
26
rehearing en banc, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. Summum's control test for government speech.
Although Justice Stevens expressed concern about the
"doubtful merit" of the few cases applying this "recently minted
government speech doctrine, 27 the majority did not have any such
21. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130 (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 1129.
23. Id. at 1130.
24. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007).
25. Id. at 1054.
26. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008).
27. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J.,
324 [Vol. 8
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reservations. Tracing the doctrine back to at least Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee," the Summum majority reaffirmed the
general principles that the government "has the right 'to speak for
itself"' and that when speaking, the government "'is entitled to say
what it wishes"' and "to select the views that it wants to express., 29
As a result, "the government's own speech ... is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny." '' According to the Court, this exemption
flows from at least three sources: (i) the text of the First
Amendment, (ii) the role of the sovereign in governing, and (iii) the
importance of having an informed electorate who can use the
political process to remove officials who advocate unpopular
policies.3 With respect to the text, the First Amendment states
only that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech., 32 The express language of the First Amendment precludes
the government from limiting speech rights generally, but it does
not impose any restrictions on what the government can or cannot
say. That is, the text of the First Amendment is silent on the scope
of government speech. Thus, as the Court acknowledges in
Summum, "[t]he Free Speech clause restricts government
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.,
33
dissenting) (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 229 (2000)) ("The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and
correspondingly imprecise. In fact, the few cases in which we have addressed
the doctrine have for the most part not gone much beyond such broad
observations as '. . . it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government
will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own
policies."').
28. 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Government is
not restrained by the First Amendment from controlling its own expression.").
29. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
30. Id. (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553
(2005)).
31. Id. at 1131-32.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131.
325
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The role of the sovereign provides a more pragmatic
justification of the government speech doctrine-the need for the
government to secure a voice in the marketplace of ideas to
promote and defend its own policies:
If every citizen were to have a right to insist
that no one paid by public funds express a view
with which he disagreed, debate over issues of
great concern to the public would be limited to
those in the private sector, and the process of
government as we know it radically
transformed.
4
Without the ability to speak, the government could not
govern.35 Accordingly, the Court has recognized consistently that
the government must be allowed to speak:
The government, as a general rule, may support
valid programs and policies by taxes or other
exactions binding on protesting parties. Within
this broader principle it seems inevitable that
funds raised by the government will be spent
for speech and other expression to advocate
and defend its own policies.1
Moreover, the government's ability to speak freely and
openly is important for another reason: it ensures that the
electorate can provide an informed check on the government. If
the government is not able to advocate its policies and decisions
free from the constraints imposed by the Free Speech Clause,
voters would not know about the government's policies and, as a
result, would be unable to elect new officials who better reflect
their goals and policy concerns. For that reason, Justice Souter and
several circuit courts take political accountability to limit the
34. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005)
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("To govern, government has to say something, and a
First Amendment heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the
government's voice in the 'marketplace of ideas' would be out of the
question.").
36. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229
(2000).
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government speech doctrine to only that speech that is identifiable
as the government's. Under their view, if the reasonable observer
cannot identify the government as the speaker, then the
government cannot avail itself of the protection that the
government speech doctrine affords.3 7 Although the Court has
never conditioned the protection of the government speech
doctrine on such an identification, a majority of the Court still views
political accountability as an important check on government
speech, one that ultimately makes the government answerable to
the public: "And of course, a government entity is ultimately
'accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy .... If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later
could espouse some different or contrary position.
'
'
31 8
1. Locating government speech on the
Court's forum continuum.
Given that government speech is exempt from scrutiny
under the Free Speech Clause, the Court must be able to determine
when the government is speaking in its own voice, as opposed to
creating a forum for private speech. But, as Summum recognizes,
the line is not always clear: "There may be situations in which it is
difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own
behalf or is providing a forum for private speech."3 9 The task is
37. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009)
("Because the specialty plates bear sufficient indicia of private speech, we
believe that under all the circumstances a reasonable and fully informed
observer would recognize the message on the 'Choose Life' specialty plate as
the message of a private party, not the state."); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 578
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("It means nothing that Government officials control
the message if that fact is never required to be made apparent to those who
get the message, let alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them.");
Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Michael, C.J., writing separately) (holding that South Carolina's "Choose
Life" plate was not government speech because, "[gliven the array of specialty
license plates available in South Carolina, a citizen is less likely to associate
the plate messages with the State.").
38. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (quoting Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235).
39. Id.
made all the more difficult because, although the Court previously
recognized government speech as a special category of speech, it
did not have occasion to explore the contours of the government
speech doctrine." In Johanns and Summum, the Court set out its
"control" test for the first time. Under this test, the key feature
distinguishing government speech from private speech in a
traditional, designated, or nonpublic forum is the level of
governmental control over the message conveyed: "In this case, it is
clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove's Pioneer Park
represent government speech ... [because] the City has 'effectively
controlled' the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by
exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection.",
41
But the government speech doctrine is not a radical
departure from the Court's traditional forum analysis. Rather, it
simply represents one end on the continuum of limitations that the
Free Speech Clause imposes on the government's regulation of
various fora. The different categories on the continuum-
traditional open, designated open, designated limited, nonpublic,
and government speech-are marked by the level of control that
the government exercises over who may speak and what they may
say. On one end are "traditional public fora," in which the
government's authority to control private speech is strictly limited.4
Traditional public fora are those public places "which 'have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
40. In Southworth, the Court did not need to consider the contours of the
government speech doctrine because the University had denied that the
speech at issue-consisting of speech funded by mandatory student activity
fees-was its own: "If the challenged speech here were financed by tuition
dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its content, the
case might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is the
speaker. That is not the case before us." Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229. See
also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) ("Within far broader limits than
petitioners are willing to concede, when the Government appropriates public
funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
program.").
41. Summum. 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (quotingJohanns, 544 U.S. at 560-61).
42. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985).
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communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.' Although reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions are permitted,44 the government may make content-
based restrictions on speech in a traditional public forum, such as a
public park or street, only if such restrictions pass strict scrutiny,
i.e., are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
45
Moreover, viewpoint restrictions are prohibited.46 Thus, under the
Court's traditional forum analysis, the government has very little
control over the message of a private speaker who is properly using
the forum.47
In addition to traditional public fora, the Court has
recognized two other types of fora that may be opened up to
private speakers for public discourse: designated open and
designated limited public fora. "To create such a forum, the
government must make an affirmative choice to open up its
property for use as a public forum. 'The government does not
create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional forum
for public discourse.' 4" By opening non-traditional fora to private
43. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
44. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 ("The State may also enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.").
45. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 748 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In
sum, it blinks reality to regard this statute, in its application to oral
communications, as anything other than a content-based restriction upon
speech in the public forum. As such, it must survive that stringent mode of
constitutional analysis our cases refer to as 'strict scrutiny,' which requires that
the restriction be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.").
46. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980).
47. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (holding that "government entities are
strictly limited in their ability to regulate private speech in such 'traditional
public fora."'); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 828 (1995) ("In the realm of private speech or expression, government
regulation may not favor one speaker over another.").
48. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003)
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund., Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985)).
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speech, the government relinquishes significant control over the
speech activity conducted on the property. In a designated open
forum, the government takes property that traditionally has not
been used for public assembly or discussion and opens it up
generally for public purposes. In so doing, the government creates
the equivalent of a traditional public forum. Therefore, any
government regulation of private speech in a designated open
forum is subject to the same standards that apply to traditional
public fora-viewpoint-based distinctions are prohibited and
content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.
But the government may open its property to some private
speech without automatically creating the equivalent of a
traditional public forum. If the government opens a forum for use
by only certain groups or for the discussion of only certain topics, it
creates a designated limited public forum. In this type of forum, the
government cedes some of its authority over who may speak and on
what topics: "When the State establishes a limited public forum, the
State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in
every type of speech. The State may be justified 'in reserving [its
forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics. ' ' 49
Because the government has not opened the forum to any and all
speech activities, "a government entity may impose restrictions on
speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.""' Although
content-based restrictions are permitted, viewpoint-based ones are
not: "The State's power to restrict speech, however, is not without
limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the
basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be 'reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum.''
Yet the government may create a forum for some forms of
private speech even though it does not open its property to the
public. The government may create a nonpublic forum by
49. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001)
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829).
50. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
51. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
806); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("These principles provide the framework
forbidding the State from exercising viewpoint discrimination, even when the
limited public forum is one of its own creation.").
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permitting non-governmental use of its property for activities that
are related to the general purpose of the property.12 For example,
in Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, the
Court held that the school could limit "a nonpublic forum to
activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property. 5 3
That is, the school could grant one teachers union access to the
school mailbox system while denying access to another union that
lost the election. Because the school retained greater control over
access to its property than it would in a designated forum, the
school had more leeway in regulating who spoke on the property
and the topics about which they spoke: "Public property which is
not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is
governed by different standards .... In addition to time, place, and
manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view., 54 According to the Court, the school excluded the union that
lost not because of its intended message but because of its status- a
union that did not have direct ties to the school. Thus, although the
designated limited forum and the nonpublic forum impose the same
restrictions - reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality - the two are
conceptually distinct.55  In a designated limited forum, the
government intentionally opens the property to certain members of
the public for certain uses, but having opened the forum for one
group to use the property, the government cannot discriminate
52. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)) ("[W]hile a public entity may not
censor speech about an authorized topic based on the point of view expressed
by the speaker, it has broad discretion to 'preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."').
53. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49
(1983).
54. Id. at 46.
55. In International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
Justice O'Connor suggested that "reasonableness" with respect to nonpublic
fora may be more demanding than the reasonableness required under the
rational basis test, but a majority of the Court has not expounded on this
distinction. 505 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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against similar groups.56 In a nonpublic forum, the government
permits only certain groups to use its property based on the nature
of the property and the status of the group, i.e., the nature of the
property imposes its own limiting condition on who can use the
property and for what purposes."
Government speech, however, is not subject to the Court's
forum analysis. As the Court concluded with respect to the
monuments in Summum, "'public forum principles . . . are out of
place in the context of this case.""'5 The respondents had argued
that the display of permanent monuments in a public park was
analogous to the "delivery of speeches and the holding of marches
and demonstrations" such that the traditional public forum analysis
should govern. 59 The Court distinguished traditional public fora
from government speech in two ways. First, and most importantly,
the Court stated that government speech is marked by the high
level of control that the government has over the message
conveyed. The City never opened a "monument forum" to private
expressive conduct. Rather, the City "'effectively controlled' the
message" by "exercising 'final approval authority''' over which
monuments to display. Thus, because the City did not create a
forum, the Court's forum analysis did not apply.
Second, the Court distinguished the different uses to which
public parks may be put. Although public parks "'have
56. For example, in Perry, if the school had opened its mailbox to the
public for school related correspondence, then it would have been much more
difficult to deny that the union lost access to the mailbox forum. By opening
the forum to the public, the school would limit its ability to make "status"
distinctions based on the nature of the property.
57. The government has even greater authority to restrict speech activity
on prison grounds and on a military base. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401 (1989) (analyzing restrictions on publications sent to prisoners in light
of government's interest in maintaining prison security); Brown v. Glines, 444
U.S. 348 (1980) (finding requirements of military discipline could justify
otherwise impermissible restrictions on speech).
58. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1137 (2009)
(quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1134 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550,
560-61 (2005)).
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immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions, ' ' 61 there is no similar tradition with respect to permanent
monuments in public parks. Put differently, public parks are
traditional public fora for some purposes but not for all. And, as
the Court makes clear, this distinction makes good practical sense.
Whereas public parks may "accommodat[e] a large number of
public speakers without defeating the essential function of the land
or the program," they cannot hold an unlimited number of
permanent monuments. 6 12 If public parks are public fora with
respect to monuments (such that at a minimum viewpoint neutrality
is required), then local, state, and federal governments "must either
'brace themselves for an influx of clutter' or face the pressure to
remove longstanding and cherished monuments., 6 3 In the end, if
monuments are not government speech but merely private speech
in an open forum, "most parks would have little choice but to
refuse all such donations. '  As the Court notes, the fact that
applying forum analysis to monuments in a public park would lead
to the closing of that forum makes it "obvious that forum analysis is
out of place.,
65
61. Id. at 1132 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
62. Summum, 129 S.Ct. at 1137.
63. Id. at 1138 (citation omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Hence, the restrictions that the Free Speech Clause imposes
on the government may be summarized as follows:
Least control Most control
Traditional Designated Designated Nonpublic Government
Public Forum Open Limited Forum Speech
Forum Forum
While Same as Government Government Outside the
reasonable traditional may open may limit Free Speech
time, place, public forum up to speakers Clause, so
and manner forum. only certain based on the both content-
restrictions are groups and nature of the based and
allowed, strict subject property, the viewpoint-
scrutiny matters, but status of the based
applies to any speech speaker, and restrictions are
content-based restrictions the subject permitted.
distinctions must be matter, but
and viewpoint reasonable any speech
discrimination and viewpoint restrictions
is prohibited. neutral. must be
reasonable
and
viewpoint
neutral.
As is apparent from this continuum, where government
speech is at issue, the traditional restrictions on government's
regulating a forum fall away. As the government's control over the
message increases, the number and type of restrictions on the
government decrease. In a traditional open or designated forum,
the government has no right to regulate each and every message or
to decide unilaterally which messages to allow. Rather, the type of
forum created dictates the level of control that the government
relinquishes over the messages of private speakers in the forum. As
a result, any government regulation of speech in a forum- whether
traditional, designated, or nonpublic-must conform to the
applicable First Amendment requirements. But given that the
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government has complete control over the message conveyed when
speaking, it is not subject to the content and viewpoint neutrality
requirements of traditional, designated, and nonpublic fora. That
is, as a speaker, the government may make viewpoint-based
distinctions without having to pass strict (or any other form of)
scrutiny.66
The distinguishing feature between government fora and
government speech is the government's control over the messages
67
conveyed. In fact, references to the government's control over the
message conveyed by monuments permeate the Court's Summum
opinion:
Governments have long used monuments to
speak to the public. . . . When a government
entity arranges for the construction of a
monument, it does so because it wishes to
convey some thought or instill some feeling in
those who see the structure.68
Across the country, "municipalities generally
exercise editorial control over donated
monuments through prior submission
requirements, design input, requested
66. Id. at 1131. See also Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that "[i]t is the
very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view").
67. In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the Court held that
advertising carried out under the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985
was government speech because "[t]he message set out in the beef promotions
[wa]s from beginning to end the message established by the Federal
Government." 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005). Similarly, in Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin v. Southworth, although the Court did not apply the
government speech doctrine, the Court acknowledged that if "the University
and its officials were responsible for its content, the case might be evaluated
on the premise that the government itself is the speaker." 529 U.S. 217, 229
(2000). See also Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Thus,
under Johanns, the more control the government has over the content of the
speech, the more likely it is to be government speech.").
68. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
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modifications, written criteria, and legislative
approvals of specific content proposals.,
69
Government decisionmakers select the
monuments that portray what they view as
appropriate for the place in question, taking
into account such content-based factors as
esthetics, history, and local culture."'
[T]he City has "effectively controlled" the
messages sent by the monuments in the Park by
exercising "final approval authority" over their
selection."
The City has selected those monuments that it
wants to display for the purpose of presenting
the image of the City that it wishes to project to
all who frequent the Park.1
2
The City's actions provided a more dramatic
form of adoption than the sort of formal
endorsement that respondent would demand,
unmistakably signifying to all Park visitors that
the City intends the monument to speak on its
behalf.73
Where the government has authority over the message, the
government may "say what it wishes., 7 4  That is, once the
69. Id. at 1133 (quoting Brief for International Municipal Lawyers
Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 at 21).
70. Id. at 1134.
71. Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-61).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833 (1995) (stating that if the government is speaking and exercises the
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government takes on the role of speaker, the government may
claim the fundamental right protected by the Speech Clause-the
right to choose the content of its message: "[T]he fundamental rule
of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.,
75
Moreover, the government's ability to determine what it
says without worrying about discriminating based on viewpoint is
rooted in the Court's precedent. The Court previously suggested
that government speech is not bound by the same content and
viewpoint neutrality requirements that attend the government's
76
regulation of public fora. For example, in Rosenberger, the Court
contrasted government speech with private speech, noting that
viewpoint-based distinctions may be proper in the former even
though they are prohibited in the latter:
It does not follow, however, and we did not
suggest in Widmar, that viewpoint-based
restrictions are proper when the University
does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of
a message it favors but instead expends funds
to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers. A holding that the University may
not discriminate based on the viewpoint of
private persons whose speech it facilitates does
not restrict the University's own speech, which
is controlled by different principles.77
Similarly, in Southworth, the Court noted that its prior decisions did
not require the State to preserve viewpoint neutrality when it was
requisite level of control over the message, "it may make content-based
choices").
75. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
76. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.C.. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792
(4th Cir. 2004) ("[Wjhen the government speaks for itself and is not regulating
the speech of others, it may discriminate based on viewpoint .... ").
77. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (holding that distinctions based
on subject matter and speaker identity "are inherent and inescapable in the
process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the
intended purpose of the property").
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the speaker: "The Court has not held, or suggested, that when the
government speaks the rules we have discussed [relating to
viewpoint neutrality in a designated limited forum] come into
play.,
78
In addition, Summum's holding that the government speech
doctrine permits viewpoint discrimination finds support in Rust v.
Sullivan. In Rust, the Court upheld a government decision to fund
an anti-abortion program under Title X because the government
had the right to promote its own policies: "when the Government
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to
define the limits of that program."7 9 Having created a program to
advance its own goals, the government could ensure that its
message was not distorted. Thus, allowing the government to
discriminate based on viewpoint was necessary to prevent others
from undermining the government's message. Otherwise, the
government, having chosen a specific message, would have to
create a program for its desired message as well as programs for
each competing viewpoint. But the Court expressly denied any
such requirement: "Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way."'" Just as the State may not interfere
directly with a third party's right to engage in protected activity
(such as speech advocating a particular position in a traditional or
designated forum), a third party cannot shut down a government
program by claiming viewpoint discrimination:
To hold that the Government
unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program
dedicated to advance certain permissible goals,
because the program in advancing those goals
78. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000); see also id. ("Where the University speaks, either in its own name
through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse
faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different.").
79. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
80. Id. at 193.
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necessarily discourages alternative goals, would
render numerous Government programs
constitutionally suspect81
Under the Court's precedent, the government has the right to
convey its desired message (e.g., promoting childbirth over
abortion) by creating a program and appropriating public funds to
support it without having to provide for the viewpoints of others.
But if the government has the authority to discriminate against
viewpoints when funding others to convey its message, the
government, a fortiori, may convey that message directly through
its speech without having to be viewpoint neutral.
Put differently, under the government speech doctrine,
there is no place for a "heckler's veto... 2 Third parties who do not
like the government's message cannot force the government either
to remain silent or to express the third parties' desired message:
When Congress established a National
Endowment for Democracy to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles, it was
not constitutionally required to fund a program
to encourage competing lines of political
philosophy such as communism and fascism.
Petitioners' assertions ultimately boil down to
the position that if the Government chooses to
subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize
analogous counterpart rights. But the Court
has soundly rejected that proposition."'
Summum holds that the same is true when the government speaks
directly instead of subsidizing the speech of others. If the
government decides to advocate a certain position, those who
disagree with the message cannot force the government to be silent
or to change its message. Accordingly, in Summum, the City could
decide to accept and display only those monuments that reflected
its chosen message regarding the history of the community.
81. Id. at 194.
82. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
83. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (citation omitted).
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Because the City, as speaker, could make content-based and
viewpoint-based distinctions without violating the Free Speech
Clause, it was not required to accept monuments from any and all
donors. In fact, the City could, under the Free Speech Clause,
accept one religiously-themed monument (i.e., the Ten
Commandments monument) while declining to display other
monuments, even other religiously-themed monuments (i.e., the
Seven Aphorisms of the Summum religion).
2. Government control over the message means that the
government's intent governs.
As discussed above, to receive the protection of the
government speech doctrine, the government must control the
speech so as to send its own message and not merely facilitate the
speech of private parties. As with the monuments in Summum, it
makes no difference whether the government creates the speech
itself or adopts the speech of others. By selecting and displaying
only "those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of
presenting the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who
frequent the Park .... The monuments that are accepted . . . are
meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government
message. ''4 Moreover, the government's message may be general
or specific. As the Court noted in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., "a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,
which if confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized
message,' would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky
verse of Lewis Carroll. '' 5 In fact, a majority in Summum seems to
approve of the general criteria that the City adopted with respect to
the acceptance and display of monuments in Pioneer Park.
Pursuant to a resolution, the City decided to display only those
84. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009)
(emphasis added).
85. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston. Inc.. 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citation omitted).
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monuments that (i) related to the history of the City, (ii) were
donated by a group with well-established connections to the
community, or (iii) were consistent with general safety and esthetic
concerns." Thus, Summum suggests that the City could accept the
Ten Commandments monument donated by a private sponsor
intending to send a general message about the City's history, not a
specific religious message about the Ten Commandments.
That the government may-and in fact has a right to-
determine its own message has two important consequences. First,
the government's intended message may differ significantly from
how others interpret that message. Although the government may
control its intended message by selecting and displaying only those
monuments that "present[] the image of the City that it wishes to
project to all who frequent the Park,""7 it cannot control how others
interpret a monument or other government message. Accordingly,
the government does not forfeit the protection of the government
speech doctrine simply because the message that it intends to send
differs from that intended by the donor or sponsor of the
monument. After all, as Summum acknowledges, a monument is
not limited to "convey[ing] only one 'message"' or only "the
message intended by the donor.""" Similarly, those who hear the
government's message may interpret the message in various ways
without converting the government's speech into private speech:
"even when a monument features the written word, the monument
may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by
different observers, in a variety of ways.""
To illustrate this point, the Court considered the message of
the mosaic of the word "Imagine" in New York City's Central Park.
Those viewing the mosaic may "imagine" a variety of things-the
music of John Lennon, the lyrics to his song of the same title, a
favorite story, a different life, a world in which there is no sickness
or religion." In fact, the list of things that people might imagine
86. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130.
87. Id. at 1134.
88. Id. at 1135.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. See id.
may be infinite. Yet, in accepting and displaying the monument,
the City of New York may have intended viewers to attribute such
varied meanings to the display or it may have intended some other
meaning. The critical point is that the City controlled the content
of the monument and agreed to display it for its own reasons. It
simply does not matter whether the government's intended message
is identical to the meaning that many (or possibly any) of the
observers ascribe to the monument: "[I]t frequently is not possible
to identify a single 'message' that is conveyed by an object or
structure, and consequently, the thoughts or sentiments expressed
by a government entity that accepts and displays such an object
may be quite different from those of either its creator or its
donor."' Where, as in Summum and Johanns, the government
exercises "effective control" over the message conveyed, the
expressive activity remains government speech even though the
government's message may be interpreted in various ways by
different donors and observers. 2
Second, under Summum, a government speaker does not
lose the protection of the government speech doctrine simply by
enlisting the help of a third-party to disseminate the government-
approved message. The Court's focus remains on who controls the
message, not on who actually delivers that message. For example,
9l. Id. at 1136.
92. Similarly, the Court acknowledged that the meaning of a monument
"may change over time" and/or may change "by the subsequent addition of
other monuments in the same vicinity." Id. For example, the Court noted
that the "meaning" of the Statue of Liberty has altered through the years,
from "an emblem of international friendship and the widespread influence of
American ideals" to "a beacon welcoming immigrants to a land of freedom."
Id. But at no point in the opinion does the Court suggest that the differences
in meaning attributed to a monument over time or to the government by
various viewers in any way determines whether the monument is government
speech. Rather, as noted above, in setting out the government speech
doctrine, the Court took the government's complete control over the
acceptance and display of the monument in Summum (and the message in
Johanns) to be determinative.
93. See, e.g., ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 378 (6th Cir.
2006) ("There is nothing in the Supreme Court's decisions in Rust or Johanns
that implies that the government has less right to control expressions of its
policies when it relies on unpaid private people. No constitutionally
342 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 8
2010] LICENSING RELIGIOUS GOV'T SPEECH 343
in Rosenberger, the Court held that in the education context
"[w]hen the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed
when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message., 94 If the government exercises the requisite level of
control over the message, "[n]o more is required." 95 Similarly, in
Rust, the Court upheld the government program that precluded
recipients of Title X funds from providing abortion-related advice.
The program in Rust was intended to promote family planning
counseling through third-party funding recipients, not to encourage
private speech generally. Yet, even though the program used non-
governmental actors to promote the preferred message, the Court
confirmed that the pro-family message was that of the government.
Given that the government "is entitled to say what it wishes," 96 it
also is permitted to decide how best to communicate and promote
that message-either directly or through third parties.
Accordingly, in determining whether the government speech
doctrine applies in a particular case, the Court's central
consideration is whether the government "effectively controlled"
the message regardless of the way in which the government chooses
to communicate that message to the public at large.
C. The interaction between the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses according to the concurring Justices.
If one read only the facts in Summum, one might think that
it is an Establishment Clause case, along the lines of Van Orden.
Through its president, the Summum religion sought to donate to
significant distinction exists between volunteer disseminators and paid
disseminators.").
94. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833 (1995); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005)
(noting that the government "is not precluded from relying on the
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from
nongovernmental sources").
95. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564.
96. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
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the City a religiously themed monument, one inscribed with the
Seven Aphorisms of the Summum religion. Despite previously
accepting and displaying in a public park a monument inscribed
with the Ten Commandments, the City declined Summum's request
but continued to display the Ten Commandments monument.
Thus, at first glance, it may appear that the City was advancing one
religion over another in violation of the Establishment Clause. The
majority opinion in Summum did not reach the Establishment
Clause issue, however, because that issue was not before the Court.
Although the parties litigated the case with the Establishment
Clause in mind, the parties pursued only the Free Speech claim.97
Yet the Court's opinion did say something about the
Establishment Clause. The government does not have unlimited
discretion to say whatever it wants-even when it has complete
control over the message-because the Establishment Clause
remains as a check on government speech, ominously lurking in the
background of the Court's decision. In fact, in what ultimately
97. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]t is also
obvious that from the start, the case has been litigated in the shadow of the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause: the city wary of associating itself
too closely with the Ten Commandments monument displayed in the park,
lest that be deemed a breach in the so-called 'wall of separation between
church and State,' ...... Respondent menacingly observed that while the city
could have formally adopted the monument as its own, that 'might of course
raise Establishment Clause issues."') (citations omitted); id. at 1141 (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("Even though ... Establishment Clause issues have been neither
raised nor briefed before us, there is no doubt that this case and its
government speech claim has been litigated by the parties with one eye on the
Establishment Clause.").
98. The majority in Summum notes two other "restraints" on
government speech. These restraints, while important, relate primarily to the
checks provided by the majoritarian process, which are beyond the scope of
this Article. First, government speakers may be constrained in what they say
"by law, regulation, or practice." Id. at 1132. That is, elected officials, in their
capacities as representatives of their constituents, may impose limits on
government advocacy through statutes or through custom. Second, as noted
above, the political process provides the ultimate check on government
speech. If the voters disagree with the government's speech or do not believe
that the government should engage in particular types of speech, the
electorate always can vote the government speakers out of office: "[A]
government entity is ultimately 'accountable to the electorate and the political
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may be one of the most important sentences of the opinion, the
majority states simply that "government speech must comport with
the Establishment Clause." The majority does not say anything
about the limits that the Establishment Clause imposes on
government speech; it says only that government speech must
comply with it. At a minimum, then, the government as speaker
cannot make any "law respecting an establishment of religion."''
But given the complexity of-or, as some have suggested,
confusion in- the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, this
is of little, if any, help. As Justice Souter notes, Summum merely
raises the issue regarding the intersection of the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses without making any attempt to explore it:
"The interaction between the 'government speech doctrine' and
Establishment Clause principles has not, however, begun to be
worked out."' "
Given the cursory mention of the Establishment Clause in
Justice Alito's opinion and the prominence of facially religious
government speech- monuments, license plates, art, and legislative
prayers-several of the concurring Justices felt compelled to
provide their views as to the effect of the Court's Summum decision
on the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. And, not
surprisingly, the Justices' reactions are quite varied. Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg emphasize that the decision is relatively
narrow in scope and "signals no expansion of [the government
speech] doctrine."" 2 Moreover, given that the Establishment and
process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later
could espouse some different or contrary position."' Id. at 1132 (quoting Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000))
(citation omitted). All of the Justices appear to agree that the political process
provides a critical check on government speech. See, e.g., Johanns, 544 U.S. at
575 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Democracy, in other words, ensures that
government is not untouchable when its speech rubs against the First
Amendment interests of those who object to supporting it; if enough voters
disagree with what government says, the next election will cancel the
message.").
99. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
101. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Equal Protection Clauses still apply to government speech, these
Justices contend that "the effect of today's decision will be
limited." "03
Justices Scalia and Thomas, on the other hand, maintain
that the Ten Commandments monument in Pioneer Park does not
violate the Establishment Clause. By ruling that monuments in
public parks are government speech, the Court did not make every
religiously-themed monument into an Establishment Clause
violation. In fact, because the Ten Commandments monument in
Pioneer Park is "virtually identical" to the monument on the Texas
State Capitol grounds, it survives Establishment Clause review for
the reasons articulated in Van Orden."" For the plurality in Van
Orden, the Ten Commandments monument has "'an undeniable
historical meaning' in addition to [its] 'religious significance.'""'
For Justice Breyer, the monument in Van Orden "conveyed a
permissible secular message" given its location in the Park, the
history behind its donation, and its proximity to numerous secular
. 106
monuments. Accordingly, Justice Scalia contends that "[t]he city
can safely exhale" because even a narrow reading of the Court's
opinion in Van Orden shows that the City has not violated the
Establishment Clause. 107
Justice Souter, though, is more cautious in his assessment of
how the Establishment Clause may affect the constitutionality of
the Ten Commandments monument in Pioneer Park. Because the
government speech doctrine is so new, he advocates a slow,
methodical approach to determining the boundaries of the
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 1140 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005)).
106. Id.
107. Summum, 129 S. Ct at 1140. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer does
not address the Establishment Clause issue. Rather, Justice Breyer writes
separately to suggest that the government speech doctrine "is a rule of thumb,
not a rigid category" and to propose an alternative test-"whether a
government action burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action's
tendency to further a legitimate government objective." Id. at 1140 (Breyer,
J., concurring). According to Justice Breyer, the Ten Commandments
monument is lawful under either the government speech doctrine or his
"proportionate restriction" test. Id. at 1141.
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government speech doctrine in the Establishment Clause context.
According to Justice Souter, under existing precedent, there is
"safety in numbers"-the more monuments included in a display,
the more the possibly religious message of a Ten Commandments
monument is diluted. But with more monuments arises the
possibility that the government is no longer speaking but instead
has created some type of public forum, which would preclude
viewpoint discrimination against the Summum religion as well as
any other group."' Yet Justice Souter anticipates that some might
argue that the government speech doctrine permits such viewpoint
discrimination, that the government may "favor some private
religious speakers over others by its choice of monuments to
accept.""' 9 Justice Souter ultimately does not evaluate the merits of
this position; rather, he simply echoes Justice Breyer's concern with
a categorical rule that all monuments are government speech.
Instead of a categorical rule, he advances a "reasonable observer"
test for government speech: "whether a reasonable and fully
informed observer would understand the expression to be
government speech, as distinct from private speech the government
chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public
land."'"". This "reasonable person" test is supposed to mirror the
endorsement test that the Court has applied in the Establishment
Clause context, thereby "serv[ing] coherence within Establishment
Clause law."' '
Unfortunately, because the Establishment Clause question
was not before the Court, none of the Justices had occasion to
consider how the Court would resolve a specific case that involved
the intersection of the government speech doctrine and the
Establishment Clause. The last section of this Article, though,
108. See id. at 1141-42 (Souter, J., concurring) ("As mementoes and
testimonials pile up, however, the chatter may well make it less intuitively
obvious that the government is speaking in its own right simply by maintaining
the monuments .... [In that caseI a further Establishment Clause prohibition
would surface, the bar against preferring some religious speakers over
others.").
109. Id. at 1142.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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takes up this task-analyzing how the Court might decide cases
where the government speech at issue is facially religious so as to
implicate the Establishment Clause. In particular, the last section
considers the impact that the government speech doctrine has on
specialty license plates that have a religious theme, such as the "I
Believe" license plate in South Carolina. If the government may
make viewpoint-based distinctions when it is speaking generally,
the question arises whether it can make such distinctions where the
message is facially religious. But, of course, the antecedent
question is whether specialty license plates are government speech,
which is the focus of the next section.
III. SUMMUM AND THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE - APPLYING THE
GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF
SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATES
A. The circuit split- locating specialty license plates on the forum-
government speech continuum.
As the concurring opinions indicate, the exact effect of the
Summum decision on the Court's interpretation of the Free Speech
and Establishment Clauses remains to be determined. To begin
evaluating the scope of Summum's impact on the Free Speech
Clause, this section focuses on how the Court's development of the
government speech doctrine in Summum resolves an ongoing
controversy between and among the circuits regarding specialty
license plates. In particular, after briefly canvassing the federal
courts' treatment of specialty plates pre-Summum, I analyze how
Summum changes the foundation upon which the majority of
circuits relies. I conclude this section by looking at the South
Carolina district court's recent decision in Summers, which enjoined
the production and distribution of the "I Believe" specialty plate.
Whereas pre-Summum the majority of circuits took specialty plates
to be private or hybrid speech, Summum dictates that South
Carolina's specialty plate program, including the "I Believe" plate,
is government speech.
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The threshold inquiry under the Free Speech Clause with
respect to specialty plates-and any other allegedly governmental
speech-is whether the government is speaking. As the Court
notes in Summum, in certain circumstances "it is difficult to tell
whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is
providing a forum for private speech . . ."2 And given this
difficulty, it is not surprising that the circuit courts analyzing
specialty license plates both pre- and post-Summum have split on
the issue whether such plates are government speech or create
some type of forum.' 3 The majority of circuits that have
considered the issue-including the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth-held that specialty license plates are either private or
hybrid speech subject to the Court's forum analysis. Two other
circuits-the Second and Eleventh-have suggested, in an
unpublished opinion and in dicta, respectively, that they hold a
similar view." 4 But even though these circuits share the general
presumption that specialty license plates create some type of forum,
they disagree as to the specific type of forum created. Pre-
Summum decisions frequently do not identify the specific type of
forum because they hold that the State discriminated based on
viewpoint, which is prohibited under all types of forum analysis.
Some courts and commentators that do reach the issue contend that
112. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
113. See, e.g.. Roach v. Stouffer. 560 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding in
a post-Summum decision that specialty plates are private speech such that
Missouri's refusal to issue a "Chose Life" plate constituted viewpoint
discrimination); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008)
(holding that specialty plates create a nonpublic forum from which Illinois
could exclude the entire subject of abortion, including a "Choose Life" plate);
Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
specialty plates create a designated limited forum such that Arizona could not
discriminate against "Choose Life" viewpoint); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen,
441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that under Johanns a "Choose Life"
specialty plate was government speech); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v.
Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding in a pre-Johanns decision that a
"Choose Life" specialty plate was a form of hybrid speech that was
unconstitutional because it discriminated based on viewpoint).
114. Children First Found., Inc. v. Martinez. 169 F. App'x 637 (2d Cir.
2006); Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 945 n.9 (11th Cir.
2003).
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specialty plates are best viewed as creating a designated open public
forum.' Others, such as the Ninth Circuit, hold that specialty
plates create a designated limited public forum, ' 16 while the Seventh
Circuit recently concluded that specialty plates create a nonpublic
forum, which allows the State to discriminate based on content
provided the discrimination is reasonable." '7  Thus, prior to
Summum, the majority view has been that specialty plates are
subject to the Court's forum analysis-whether designated open,
designated limited, or nonpublic-and that the government,
therefore, cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination when
regulating speech on specialty license plates.
To date, the only circuit that has viewed specialty plates as
government speech is the Sixth, which held that Johanns supplied
the proper test for deciding whether the government speech
doctrine applies in a specific situation. According to the Sixth
Circuit, Johanns looked at the level of control that the government
exercises over the specialty plate program. Because Tennessee
"effectively controlled" the message and retained veto authority
over specialty plates, the Sixth Circuit held that the "Choose Life"
115. See, e.g.. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F.
Supp. 2d 941, 948 (W.D. Va. 2001), affd on other grounds, 288 F.3d 610 (4th
Cir. 2002) (holding that Virginia's specialty plate program was "precisely the
type of designated public forum contemplated by the Court in Cornelius"
because in creating the program Virginia demonstrated its desire "to open up
a nontraditional forum for public discourse"); Berry, supra note 5, at 1624-30
(stating that specialty plates create a designated public forum because "the
'Choose Life' plates involve an intentional effort by the states to open a
nonpublic forum, the standard state license plate . . ... "); Guggenheim &
Silversmith, supra note 5. at 577-79 (contending that specialty plates create a
designated or limited public forum, while vanity plates are a nonpublic forum).
116. Stanton, 515 F.3d at 971 ("We therefore conclude that Arizona's
specialty license plate program is a limited public forum, and that any access
restriction must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum.").
117. White, 547 F.3d at 865 (holding that Illinois's denial of a "Choose
Life" specialty plate was constitutional because specialty plates create a
nonpublic forum, but that Illinois's decision to exclude specialty plates relating
to "the entire subject of abortion" was reasonable).
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specialty plate was government speech.'" Moreover, because the
government speech doctrine permits the government to engage in
viewpoint discrimination, the Sixth Circuit contended that the State
of Tennessee may offer the "Choose Life" plate even if it refused to
approve a "Pro-Choice" specialty plate. ' 9
Out of all the circuits that have addressed the issue so far,
only the Eighth Circuit has considered a challenge to a State's
specialty license plate program post-Summum. After reviewing the
decisions by its sister circuits as well as Johanns and Summum, the
Eighth Circuit joined the majority in holding that the messages on
specialty plates implicate private speech. Although the Eighth
Circuit panel acknowledged that, "under Johanns, the more control
the government has over the content of the speech, the more likely
it is to be government speech,"'2 " the panel articulated a test that
does not focus on the level of governmental control over the
message conveyed.' 2 ' Rather, the panel predicated the ability of
the State to invoke the government speech doctrine on a reasonable
and well-informed observer identifying the speech as that of the
government: "Our analysis boils down to one key question:
whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully
informed observer would consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party.'" 
2 2
118. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 ("in this case, Johanns requires the court
to conclude that 'Choose Life' is Tennessee's message because the Act
determines the overarching message and Tennessee approves every word on
such plates.").
119. Id. In Henderson v. Stalder, the Fifth Circuit also confronted a
challenge to a "Choose Life" specialty plate. The Fifth Circuit ultimately did
not reach the government speech issue, ruling instead that the Tax Injunction
Act precluded plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to Louisiana's specialty
license plate program. 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005). The Stalder decision was
not unanimously welcomed by the Fifth Circuit. Writing in dissent from the
Fifth Circuit's denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Davis (joined
by seven other members of the court) argued that the Tax Injunction Act did
not apply and that the panel should have reached the merits of the underlying
claim. Henderson v. Stalder, 434 F.3d 352, 353-56 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Davis, J., dissenting).
120. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 867-68.
122. Id. at 867.
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In formulating this test, the Eighth Circuit built on the
Seventh Circuit's analysis as well as Justice Souter's dissent in
Johanns. In Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v. White, the Seventh Circuit
created a four-factor test that the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
adopted for evaluating the status of specialty plates, but determined
that those factors "can be distilled (and simplified) by focusing on
the following inquiry: under all the circumstances, would a
reasonable person consider the speaker to be the government or a
private party?"'23  The panel's analysis tracked Justice Souter's
position in Johanns that the government must be identifiable as the
speaker if the government is to secure the protection of the
government speech doctrine. In particular, he argued that the
compelled subsidies in Johanns were appropriate to support
government speech only if the government clearly identified such
speech as its own:
I take the view that if government relies on the
government-speech doctrine to compel specific
groups to fund speech with targeted taxes, it
must make itself politically accountable by
indicating that the content actually is a
government message, not just the statement of
one self-interested group the government is
currently willing to invest with power.14
Justice Souter also articulated his position through his "reasonable
observer test," which he set forth in his concurrence in Summum.
According to Justice Souter, speech is government speech only if "a
reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the
expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech
the government chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be
placed on public land."' 25 But these "reasonable observer" tests are
not altogether novel, as is apparent from the work of Professors
Bezanson and Buss, who developed a similar test several years
123. Choose Live Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008).
124. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 571-72 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
125. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009)
(Souter, J., concurring).
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earlier. Under their view, government speech is defined by
"purposeful action by government, expressing its own distinct
message, which is understood by those who receive it to be the
government's message." 126
In applying its "reasonable observer" test to Missouri's
specialty plate program, the Eighth Circuit held that a reasonable
and fully informed observer would view the vehicle owner, not the
government, as the speaker. 127 The panel's conclusion flowed, in
part, from its view of the purposes of the specialty plate legislation,
which were "to allow private organizations to promote their
messages and raise money and to allow private individuals to
support those organizations and their messages." 28 Framed in this
way, the purpose was to open specialty plates to private speakers,
thereby creating a forum for expression by motorists. Under the
Eighth Circuit's view, Missouri did not use specialty plates to
express its views but permitted private persons to engage in private
expressive conduct through the program.
And the Eighth Circuit took the governing statutes to
confirm this view. Under Missouri's statutes, specialty plates may
be authorized by a legislative or Department of Revenue (DOR)
process. 12 In the latter case, editorial control over the content on
the specialty plates is shared between the State and the sponsoring
organization.' Although the Joint Committee on Transportation
Oversight ("Joint Committee") has final authority to approve or
reject an application, it must do so based only on the general
description of the proposed plate that the sponsoring organization
provides as part of the application. 3' If the Joint Committee
approves the plate, then the DOR must produce the specialty plate
126. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of
Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1384 (2001). See also Leslie
Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking? Disentangling Government and Private
Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 66 (2002) (noting that government
speech must include an "identifiable and constitutionally valid message").
127. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009).
128. Id. at 867.
129. Id. at 862.
130. Id. at 867.
131. Id.
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as approved and without any additional input from the Joint
Committee or any other government entity." In addition, the
Eighth Circuit takes two other features of the Missouri program to
be important to its analysis: (i) the number of specialty plates
offered and (ii) the voluntary nature of the specialty plate program.
First, given that Missouri offers more than 200 specialty plates, the
court contends that it is not reasonable to believe that the
government is sending each of those messages.'33 For example, the
132. Although the panel relies on a reasonable observer test, it still
retains the general features of the Sons of Confederate Veterans v.
Commissioner of Virginia Dep't of Motor Vehicles ("SCV") factors in its
analysis. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. Based on (what the panel
takes to be) the shared control over the content of specialty plates, the panel
concludes that the motorists who purchase and display specialty plates "are
the literal speakers who bear the ultimate responsibility for the message."
Roach, 560 F.3d at 867-68. The panel neither explains how the Joint
Committee's final approval power affects this analysis nor discusses why the
legislative process, pursuant to which the legislature passes legislation
specifying the details of a new specialty plate, does not make the government
responsible for the content of the legislatively approved specialty plate. This
latter question is all the more important given that (i) the legislative process
and not the DOR process accounts for seventy of the specialty plates that have
been approved in Missouri and (ii) the Missouri legislature has passed
legislation creating a variety of specialty license plates (e.g., "Choose Life,"
"God Bless America," "Conservation," and "Be an Organ Donor") that are
not, at least on their face, readily identifiable with a sponsoring organization -
and that may express a policy that the State of Missouri seeks to promote
and/or encourage). Id. at 862.
133. Roach, 560 F.3d at 868. On this point, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits
also disagree. In Bredesen, the Sixth Circuit notes that "there is nothing
implausible about the notion that Tennessee would use its license plate
program to convey messages regarding over one hundred groups, ideologies,
activities, and colleges. Government in this age is large and involved in
practically every aspect of life." 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, in
Roach, the Eighth Circuit does not consider the possibility that, by approving
so many different plates, the State is sending a message about its own image -
from the diversity of its citizen's interests and their education backgrounds to
the causes that the State and its citizenry support (such as organ donation,
pro-childbirth, good treatment of animals, conservation, etc.). Yet Summum
expressly acknowledges the government's interest in expressing and right to
control this type of message: "Government decisionmakers select the
monuments that portray what they view as appropriate for the place in
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court concludes that a reasonable observer would not believe that
the government is conveying a message about Catholicism or the
existence of God by authorizing specialty plates for the Knights of
Columbus or the Grand Lodge, respectively.1 4 As Justice Souter
suggests, "[a]s mementoes and testimonials pile up, however, the
chatter may well make it less intuitively obvious that the
government is speaking in its own right simply by maintaining" the
specialty plate program. 135  Second, the court emphasizes the
voluntary nature of the specialty plate program. Because motorists
choose to display a specific specialty plate, a reasonable observer
would take the vehicle owner to be the speaker, who is willing to
pay extra to convey her own message. And in a footnote, the
Eighth Circuit denies that the Court's decision in Summum alters
the analysis or outcome. 36 Accordingly, Missouri's specialty plate
program constitutes private speech because a reasonable observer
would find the message to be that of the motorist, not the
government.
question, taking into account such content-based factors as esthetics, history,
and local culture." 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).
134. Roach, 560 F.3d at 868. In light of Summum and Van Orden,
though, the panel's analysis appears to provide a false dichotomy-either the
government is endorsing religion or the speech is private. But this is not an
exhaustive list of the possibilities. Under Summum, the government may
mean something different than the sponsoring organization intended. For
example, while the Knights of Columbus may take the specialty plate to
promote Catholicism, Missouri may view it as a statement about the tradition
and diversity of its citizenry, among whom are Catholics who participate in
groups, such as the Knights of Columbus, that play important roles in the
community.
135. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141-42 (Souter, J., concurring).
136. Roach, 560 F.3d at 868 n.3. The Eighth Circuit distinguishes
Summum on the grounds that monuments are different from specialty plates:
"Unlike monuments displayed in public parks, specialty license plates that
advertise the name or motto of a private organization facilitate expressive
conduct on the part of the organization and its supporters, not the
government." Id.
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B. Summers- The "I Believe" specialty plate is hybrid speech under
the majority view.
As the circuit court cases above indicate, "Choose Life"
specialty plates have been the subject of much litigation across the
country. But challenges to other types of specialty license plates
have surfaced, and courts have applied the majority view to these
cases as well. For example, the district court in South Carolina
recently applied the majority view in Summers v. Adams, 37 holding
that specialty plates are hybrid speech subject to the Court's forum
analysis. 38 But Summers does something that the "Choose Life"
cases do not-provides an example of facially religious speech that
directly implicates the Establishment Clause. Thus, Summers
serves as a vehicle to explore not only the scope of Summum's
government speech doctrine but also its intersection with the
Establishment Clause, which is taken up in the next section.
South Carolina, like all other States, requires that motor
vehicles be registered with and licensed by the Department of
Motor Vehicles ("DMV"). As part of this program, vehicle owners
must pay a standard biennial registration fee of $24, which permits
registrants to choose between two South Carolina license plates: (i)
a dark blue palmetto tree and a crescent moon silhouetted against
an orange sunrise with the words "Travel2SC.com" on the bottom,
or (ii) a United States flag and the South Carolina State flag in the
middle of a white plate with the words "In God We Trust" across
the top. 39 For an additional fee and subject to some qualifications
137. No. 3:08-2265-CMC, 2008 WL 5401537 (D.S.C. Dec. 23, 2008).
138. Id. at *16.
139. Id. at *2. The palmetto tree plate is the standard-issue plate-if a
vehicle owner does not request anything else, this is the plate that she will
receive. The "In God We Trust" plate is a legislatively authorized specialty
plate that is available for the same $24 fee as the standard-issue plate pursuant
to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-9200. Id. Although the phrase "In God We Trust"
might also raise Establishment Clause concerns, this issue goes beyond the
scope of this Article. Moreover, other courts, relying on the Supreme Court's
approval of "ceremonial deism," have held that this phrase in the context of
license plates does not infringe on the Establishment Clause. See id. at *13
n.25 ("In addition, the legislature has authorized an 'In God We Trust' plate.
Although the court is not aware of any legal challenge to that plate, the
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for certain plates, 411 South Carolina motorists may choose from
more than 110 specialty license plates. Individuals or organizations
also may seek approval of additional specialty plates through either
of two statutorily prescribed processes: 141 (i) legislative
authorization and (ii) DMV approval of applications by qualifying
organizations or institutions. 142
Pursuant to the legislative process, the South Carolina
General Assembly may authorize specialty plates by statute. A
specialty plate statute "is adopted in the same manner as any other
legislation."4 4 The South Carolina legislature has not imposed any
specific design limitations on specialty plates that it might approve
and, therefore, may authorize specialty plates with mottos,
statements, images, and/or symbols without any prior restrictions as
to size or placement.144 The legislature may restrict a specialty
Supreme Court has recognized that the national motto, 'In God We Trust,'
has lost its religious meaning through overuse and therefore does not violate
the Establishment Clause."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984)
(stating that "In God We Trust" has lost its religious significance through
"rote repetition"); Studler v. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 896 N.E.2d 1156,
1160-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding "In God We Trust" license plate
against a privileges and immunities challenge under the Indiana State
Constitution).
140. For example, South Carolina offers a specialty plate that has the
picture of a Purple Heart on the plate as well as the words "Purple Heart."
This plate is not available to all motorists: rather, a motorist seeking this
specialty plate must show that he or she received a Purple Heart. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-3-3310 (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
141. Vehicle owners in South Carolina, as in other States, also may order
a "vanity plate," which consists of a unique combination of letters and/or
numbers on a South Carolina license plate. Vanity plates are governed by
rules that are different from the rules for specialty plates, e.g., South Carolina
vanity plates are limited to seven characters and require the vehicle owner to
pay the basic biennial registration fee of $24 as well as an additional $30 fee.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-2010 (2006).
142. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-3710 (2006) (college or university
license plates); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-7750 (2006 & West Supp. 2009)
(fraternity and sorority license plates); and S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000 (2006
& West Supp. 2009) (non-profit organization license plates).
143. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *3.
144. See id. at *3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8100 (2006 & West Supp. 2009)
(describing the requirements that apply to specialty plates that the General
Assembly approves after January 1, 2006).
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license plate to qualifying individuals-e.g., Purple Heart
recipients, Medal of Honor recipients, or Lions Club members-or
may make a specialty plate available to motorists generally without
imposing qualifications-e.g., "First in Golf" or "In God We
Trust."
Pursuant to the DMV process, the DMV may issue specialty
license plates to non-profit organizations meeting certain
requirements and may adopt additional policies relating to the
issuance of DMV-approved specialty plates. 145  As a result, the
DMV process is more cumbersome and limited than the legislative
process. A non-profit organization seeking a specialty plate must
incorporate with a State and secure 501(c)(3), 501(c)(7), or
501(c)(8) tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service at
least five years prior to applying for a specialty plate. 46  If the
organization has maintained its non-profit status for at least five
years, then it may apply to the DMV for a specialty plate. The
application to the DMV must include each of the following: (1) a
request for a specialty plate on the letterhead of the organization;
(2) completed DMV Forms RG-504(a) and 504(d); (3) written
permission to use any copyrighted or registered trademark, logo, or
other design; (4) a computer CD containing a copy of the artwork
to be displayed on the license plate and one color, hard copy of the
artwork; (5) a detailed marketing plan; and (6) the specific amount
above the standard $24 fee, if any, that the organization seeks to
have directed to the sponsoring organization. 141
After receiving a completed application, the Special Plate
Review Panel of the DMV, which consists of members that the
DMV Director appoints, reviews the application to ensure that the
proposed plate satisfies all the design requirements. For example,
145. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *3. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-
8000 (2006 & West Supp. 2009) (non-profit organization license plates); S.C.
DMV Policy RG-504, available at http://www.scdmvonline.com/DMVNew/
forms/rg-504.pdf (guidelines for application, approval, production, and
distribution of specialty plates).
146. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *3.
147. Id. In addition to the application, the sponsoring non-profit
organization must provide documents verifying its tax-exempt status and
provide copies of its tax returns for the last five years. Id.
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specialty plates approved pursuant to the DMV process can contain
only those mottos or words that are part of the organization's
emblem, seal, or symbol, and any graphic to be included on the
plate must meet certain maximum size requirements.•41 Moreover,
the Special Plate Review Panel must determine that the design is
"appropriate," i.e., that the design is not "offensive" and that it
meets "community standards of propriety." 49 The Review Panel
may reject a proposed specialty plate if it decides that the plate is
"controversial, . . . or [subject to] litigation in other states," is
"partisan," or is "potentially offensive, controversial, or
inappropriate to the public."' 5" Following its review, the Review
Panel has one of three options: it may approve, conditionally
approve, or reject the application. If the design is approved, the
DMV produces two sample plates, which are forwarded to the
Highway Patrol for approval. If approved by the Highway Patrol,
the DMV's Chief of Staff and Director also must sign off on the
design.' 5 ' If the Review Panel rejects the application and the Chief
of Staff and Director agree with that decision, the sponsoring
organization is notified and may either appeal or submit a new
design, in which case the process starts over again.
Despite their differences, the legislative and DMV
processes are similar in two significant ways. First, and most
important for present purposes, since September 7, 2007, the
legislature has had final review over both processes, either through
the legislature's ability to pass new legislation or through the
legislative review committee. 5 2 Although an organization may
appeal an adverse DMV decision to the legislative review
committee, the review committee has authority to overrule any
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id. at *4 (quoting S.C. DMV Policy RG-504).
150. Id.
151. Id. The DMV follows a similar procedure for designs that are
conditionally approved. The DMV's Chief of Staff and Director review the
conditionally approved design and make suggested modifications. The
sponsoring organization is notified of the suggested modifications and
provided the opportunity either to submit a re-designed specialty plate or to
appeal the initial decision. Id.
152. Summer, 2008 WLS 401537, at *3-4.
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DMV decision (whether on appeal or not).'53 After review, the
review committee may direct the DMV to end production of any
specialty plate that the review committee "deems offensive or that
fails to meet community standards."' 5 4 Accordingly, as the district
court acknowledges in Summers, "all special plates are subject to
final approval by the legislative committee."' 55
Second, production of any specialty plate does not
commence immediately upon approval. Once a proposed specialty
plate is approved by either the legislative or the DMV process, the
DMV cannot produce and distribute the new specialty plate unless
it receives 400 prepaid applications for the new plate or a $4,000
deposit from a sponsoring individual or organization. 56 Further,
the DMV must approve a marketing plan prior to production,'57
and the sponsoring person or entity must provide any emblem, seal,
or other symbol that is to be included on the specialty plate along
with the appropriate permission to reproduce such emblem, seal, or
symbol. 15" After each of these requirements has been met, the
DMV may produce and distribute the specialty plate.
In April 2008, two members of the South Carolina General
Assembly introduced a bill to authorize a specialty plate with the
words "I Believe" and the "image of a cross superimposed on a
stained glass window."'' 5 9 The South Carolina General Assembly
unanimously approved the legislation, which stated:
The Department of Motor Vehicles may issue
"I Believe" special motor vehicle license plates
to owners of private motor vehicles registered
in their names. The plate must contain the
words "I Believe" and a cross superimposed on
153. Id. at *4.
154. Id. at *4 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000 (2006 & West Supp.
2009)). As the district court notes, this statute was amended in 2006 to create
the legislative review committee to oversee the DMV process regarding
specialty plates proposed by organizations. Id.
155. Id.
156. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(B)(1) (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
157. Id. § 56-3-8000(B)(2).
158. Id. § 56-3-8000(G).
159. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *1.
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a stained glass window. The biennial fee for
this special license plate is the same as the fee
provided in Article 5, Chapter 3 of this title.
The guidelines for the production of this special
license plate must meet the requirements
contained in Section 56-3-8100."
Thus, the "I Believe" specialty plate was authorized
pursuant to the legislative process and became law in June 2008
without the Governor's signature. The DMV, following the
suggestion of the Governor, subsequently imposed an additional $5
fee to cover the cost of producing the "I Believe" specialty plate. 
61
By November 2008, the DMV had received the required 400
prepaid applications and prepared to begin production of the "I
Believe" specialty plate. In June 2008, though, plaintiffs filed suit
to stop the production and distribution of the "I Believe" plate,
claiming that the plate (i) endorsed religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause and (ii) abridged the Free Speech Clause by
discriminating against certain religious and non-religious
viewpoints. In its opinion dated December 23, 2008, the district
court enjoined the production of the "I Believe" specialty plate
based on plaintiffs' likely success on the merits of their
Establishment Clause claim.
Although the district court based its injunction primarily on
its Establishment Clause analysis, the court did consider plaintiffs'
Free Speech claim so that the Fourth Circuit might review all
aspects of the case on appeal. 62 Specifically, recognizing that a
government speaker may advocate its own policies and exclude
160. Id. (quoting Act No. 253, which was to be codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-3-10110).
161. Id. at *2.
162. Although the district court analyzed plaintiffs' Free Speech claim, it
held that the Free Speech claim was best understood as an Establishment
Clause claim: "Plaintiffs complain that the legislature has improperly singled
out one 'favored' viewpoint, Christianity, for promotion. This, however,
strikes the court as an Establishment Clause argument, not a Free Speech
(viewpoint discrimination) argument." Id. at *8.
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opposing viewpoints,13 the district court determined that South
Carolina's specialty plate program created "hybrid speech," i.e., a
mixture of government and private speech, subject to the Court's
forum analysis. The district court reached this conclusion by
applying the four-factor test articulated by the Fourth Circuit in
Rose and Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV).I64 In Rose, the three
judge panel held, by way of three separate opinions, that the
"Choose Life" message on a South Carolina specialty plate (which
was adopted pursuant to a similar legislative process as the "I
Believe" plate) was hybrid speech. In so holding, the panel rejected
the State's claim that viewpoint discrimination was permissible with
respect to the messages on specialty plates because such plates were
government speech. Judge Michael based his opinion on the four-
factor SCV test. Under this test, whether speech is government or
private is determined by analyzing: (1) the central purpose of the
program in which the speech occurs, (2) the extent of editorial
control that the government or other entities exercise over the
content of the speech, (3) the identity of the literal speaker, and (4)
whether the government or the private entity is ultimately
responsible for the content of the speech. 65 Applying the test in
Rose, Judge Michael found that the "Choose Life" plate was hybrid
speech and that South Carolina engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by approving only the "Choose Life" plate. 
66
163. Id. at *15 ("If the speech is pure government speech, the state is
presenting its own message rather than creating a forum and may advocate in
favor of its policies without including opposing viewpoints.").
164. See Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792-93
(4th Cir. 2004): Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of Va. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002). In Bredesen, the Sixth
Circuit held that Johanns replaced the four-factor test that Judge Michael
applied in Rose: "Johanns sets forth an authoritative test for determining when
speech may be attributed to the government for First Amendment purposes.
Rose relied instead on a pre-Johanns four-factor test of the Fourth Circuit's
own devising that led to an 'indeterminate result' on the crucial issue of
whether 'Choose Life' specialty plates express a governmental message."
ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006).
165. Rose, 361 F.3d at 792-93.
166. Id. at 784.
[Vol. 8
2010] LICENSING RELIGIOUS GOV'T SPEECH
In Summers, the district court also applied the SCV test and
reached the same conclusion-that specialty plates are hybrid
speech such that the government cannot discriminate based on
viewpoint. Specifically, the district court held that the first and
second factors weighed in favor of the "I Believe" plate being
government speech. Consistent with the "Choose Life" plate in
Rose, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the legislation
creating the specialty plate program and controlled the specific
content of the plate. 17 Yet the district court concluded that the
third and fourth factors weighed in favor of private speech.
Because specialty plates "are associated at least partly with the
vehicle owners '' ""X and the owners choose which plates to display on
their vehicles, the district court held that the purchaser of the plate
"bore the ultimate responsibility for the speech on the 'Choose
Life' [and 'J Believe'] license plate[s]."'' 69 Thus, even though the
SCV factors pulled in different directions (as they had in Rose), the
court determined that the Fourth Circuit would reach the same
result in the "I Believe" case. Moreover, even if Johanns might
change the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the district court did not
167. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *16. See also Rose, 361 F.3d at 793
(finding that the second SCV factor supports government speech because "the
idea for a Choose Life plate originated with the State. and the legislature
determined that the plate will bear the message 'Choose Life.' The State thus
exercises complete editorial control over the content of the speech on the
Choose Life plate.").
168. Rose 361 F.3d at 794. Judge Michael, who invoked the four-factor
test in his opinion, based his conclusion in part on the Supreme Court's ruling
in Wooley. Because the message on the standard-issue New Hampshire
license plate ("Live Free or Die") is associated with the vehicle owner, the
message on a "voluntary" specialty plate, i.e., a plate that vehicle owners may
choose to display but are not required to do so, also must be associated with
the vehicle owner.
169. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *16. With respect to the Choose
Life plate, Judge Michael held that, although specialty plates are state-owned
and carry a state-authorized message, "the specialty plate gives private
individuals the option to identify with, purchase, and display one of the
authorized messages. . . . [T]he private individual bears the ultimate
responsibility for the speech on the Choose Life plate ... [because] the private
individual chooses to spend additional money to obtain the plate and to
display its pro-life message on her vehicle." Rose, 361 F.3d at 794.
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believe that Johanns would change the result, i.e., the conclusion
that specialty plates are hybrid speech:
The undersigned does not, however, believe
that the Fourth Circuit would reach a different
result where the decision to purchase the plate
at issue is a matter of choice wholly within the
discretion of the vehicle owner .... [especially
where, as here,] the state actors take the
position that the plate at issue is not
governmental endorsement of religion for the
very reason that the decision to purchase and
display the plate is an individual one.""
C. Summum's control test is inconsistent with Summers and the
majority view.
The district court in Summers did not provide an extensive
analysis of plaintiffs' Free Speech claim, having found that plaintiffs
lacked standing to assert such a claim. But the district court did
join the majority of circuits in holding that specialty plates implicate
private speech sufficiently to trigger the Court's forum analysis.
Although the district court might disagree with other courts as to
the specific type of forum created, they all agree that specialty
license plates are not government speech. As a result, if specialty
license plates are government speech under Summum, then the
district court in Summers, along with the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits, must reconsider its treatment of specialty
license plates. This section explains why specialty license plates are
government speech under the control test developed in Summum
and Johanns and why the majority view therefore fails.'
170. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at "16.
171. In this way, license plates are similar to monuments-both are
meant to be "a means of expression." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.
Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009). Although the history of monuments may be longer and
the message frequently more compelling, license plates, at a minimum,
certainly are meant to convey information about the particular vehicle, e.g., its
registration and compliance with inspections. When the government institutes
a program for specialty plates that contain additional information about
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Prior to Summum and Johanns, the Court had identified
government speech as a distinct category of speech and indicated
that the rules governing it differed markedly from those applied
under the Court's forum analysis. But, other than some general
statements about government speech, the Court had not set out
specific criteria to help circuit courts know when the doctrine
applied. Summum and Johanns changed that by identifying
government control over the message conveyed as the key feature
of government speech. As the Sixth Circuit noted: "Johanns stands
for the proposition that when the government determines an
overarching message and retains power to approve every word
disseminated at its behest, the message must be attributed to the
government for First Amendment purposes."' 7 2 And the Court
applied the same standard in Summum. Monuments displayed in
public parks are government speech because "the City has
,effectively controlled' the messages sent by the monuments in the
Park by exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection."' 73
The Court's focus on the government's control over the
content and wording of the message is in stark contrast to the
majority view that finds expression in Rose, Roach, Stanton, and
White. Unlike these circuit court cases, under Summum and
Johanns the identity of the speaker does not determine whether the
government speech doctrine applies in a particular case. Because
the government has the right to speak for itself, the Court instead
focuses on whether the government is actually speaking, not on
whether a reasonable observer would identify the government as
the speaker. 1 4 The majority view, which takes specialty plates to
groups, institutions, or individuals related to a particular state, the expressive
use of plates is increased, not diminished: "When a government entity
arranges for the construction of a monument [or specialty plate]. it does so
because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who
see the structure [or license plate]." Id.
172. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006).
173. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg.
Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 560-61 (2005)).
174. This is not to say that identifying the government as speaker cannot
assist the court in assessing the level of control the government has over the
message. Rather, it recognizes only that such an identification is not required.
For instance, Summum notes that people are likely to identify the monuments
365
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
be (at least partly) private speech, therefore, is incompatible with
Summum for at least three reasons.
First, those circuits taking the central inquiry to be
"whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully
informed observer would consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party"' 75 predicate their view on a position
that, while understandable, was rejected by the Court in Johanns.
Because political accountability provides a primary check on
government speech, it makes intuitive sense to require the
government to be identifiable as the speaker before invoking the
government speech doctrine, as Justice Souter argued in his
Summum concurrence.7 6 But as Justice Souter acknowledged in
his dissent in Johanns, the majority takes "control" over the
message, and not the identity of the speaker, to be the essential
requirement for government speech: "The Court takes the view
that because Congress authorized this scheme and the Government
controls (or at least has a veto on) the content of the beef ads, the
need for democratic accountability has been satisfied."' 77 In fact, in
in Pioneer Park with the government: "The City's actions provided a more
dramatic form of adoption than the sort of formal endorsement that
respondent would demand, unmistakably signifying to all Park visitors that the
City intends the monument to speak on its behalf." Summum, 129 S. Ct. at
1134. But the Court neither adopts a reasonable observer test nor overrules
Johanns, in which the Court expressly denied that a reasonable observer must
be able to identify the government as the speaker for the government speech
doctrine to apply.
175. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009).
176. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he best
approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed
observer would understand the expression to be government speech, as
distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige by allowing the
monument to be placed on public land.").
177. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 578 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court takes
the view that because Congress authorized this scheme and the Government
controls (or at least has a veto on) the content of the beef ads, the need for
democratic accountability has been satisfied. But the Court has it backwards.
It means nothing that Government officials control the message if that fact is
never required to be made apparent to those who get the message, let alone if
it is affirmatively concealed from them." (citation omitted)). In Rose, Judge
Michael appears to share Justice Souter's concern with permitting government
speech without direct accountability: "It might be argued that South Carolina
[Vol. 8
2010] LICENSING RELIGIOUS GOV'T SPEECH 367
Johanns, the majority expressly rejected any such "identification"
requirement. The beef ads in Johanns were government speech
because "[t]he message set out in the beef promotions is from
beginning to end the message established by the Federal
Government," 78 regardless of whether a reasonable observer could
identify the government as the speaker:
But the correct focus is not on whether the ads'
audience realizes the Government is speaking,
but on the compelled assessment's purported
interference with respondents' First
Amendment rights. As we hold today,
respondents enjoy no right not to fund
government speech -whether . . . or not the
reasonable viewer would identify the speech as
the government's. 17
The fact that someone may (improperly) view a third party as the
speaker does not undermine the government's ability to claim the
protection of the government speech doctrine any more than the
"American Beef Producers" label precluded the federal
government from doing so in Johanns. Thus, although the Court
could require the government to identify itself as the speaker (or at
least appear as the speaker to the reasonable observer), neither
Johanns nor Summum imposes such a requirement on government
speech.
is not hiding its identification with the message on the Choose Life plate
because the General Assembly enacted the statute making the plate available
... . But this argument overlooks the fact that continuing transparency is
essential to accountability." Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361
F.3d 786, 798 (4th Cir. 2004). Judge Michael's insistence on an express
connection between certain speech and the government is inconsistent with
Johanns, which further undermines the vitality of Rose post-Summum.
178. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-61; see also Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134
("Government decisionmakers select the monuments that portray what they
view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into account such
content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture. That monuments
that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect of
conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government
speech.").
179. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7.
Given that the "reasonable observer" test is similar to the
Fourth Circuit's four-factor SCV test,18') it is not surprising that
Johanns and Summum also replace this multi-factor test. Although
the Supreme Court had not articulated standards for the
government speech doctrine when the Fourth Circuit adopted the
SCV factors,18 such is not the case post-Summum. Whereas the
district court considered all four factors, weighing the identity of
the speaker and who had responsibility for the speech more heavily,
neither Johanns nor Summum relies on a multi-factor test when
analyzing possible government speech. Under Summum and
Johanns, the government speaks when it "sets the overall message
to be communicated" and "approves every word that is
disseminated,"''8 2 regardless of whether third parties know that the
government is doing so. If the government exercises the requisite
level of control, the message is government speech. To the extent
one or more of the SCV factors relate to the level of governmental
control, such factors may assist the Court in assessing whether
speech is government speech. But, as discussed above, Johanns
expressly denies that the government speech doctrine requires a
reasonable observer to identify the government as the speaker.
Thus, the district court's analysis of the Free Speech claim fails
because it improperly relies on the reasonable observer's ability to
180. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the four-factor test used by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits "can
be distilled (and simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry: Under all
the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to be the
government or a private party?").
181. Rose, 361 F.3d at 792 (acknowledging that "[n]o clear standard has
yet been enunciated in our circuit or by the Supreme Court for determining
when the government is 'speaking' and thus able to draw viewpoint-based
distinctions, and when it is regulating private speech and thus unable to do
so") (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of Va. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)). In SCV, the Fourth Circuit
held that, although the Commonwealth of Virginia authorized a specialty plate
for the nonprofit organization, the State discriminated against the SCV's
viewpoint when it prohibited that plate from bearing the SCV's emblem,
which included a Confederate flag.
182. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
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identify the government as the speaker instead of the government's
level of control over the message.
Second, while the Eighth Circuit considered the impact that
Summum might have on its analysis and, by extension, the majority
view, the panel summarily held that Summum did not change the
outcome. Specifically, in a short footnote, the Eighth Circuit
distinguished Summum on the grounds that specialty plates, unlike
permanent monuments, "advertise the name or motto of a private
organization [and therefore] facilitate expressive conduct on the
part of the organization and its supporters, not the government.
''X 3
Unfortunately, the panel does not provide any more explanation.
But without more, the panel's analysis appears to rest on its
"reasonable observer" test-because specialty plates carry the
name or motto of third parties, a reasonable observer would
identify the third party as the speaker instead of the government.
Yet the Eighth Circuit's "reasonable observer" test ignores two
central tenets in Summum: (i) that the government may engage in
speech even though a reasonable observer interprets the message
differently than the government intended or, under Johanns,
attributes the message to someone other than the government and
(ii) that the government speech doctrine does not preclude a
private person, who assists the government in disseminating its
message, from engaging in expressive activity.8 As Summum
expressly states, a monument may convey more than one message:
Contrary to respondent's apparent belief, it
frequently is not possible to identify a single
'message' that is conveyed by an object or
structure, and consequently, the thoughts or
sentiments expressed by a government entity
that accepts and displays such an object may be
183. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009).
184. See Children First Found., Inc. v. Martinez, 169 F. App'x 637, 639
(2d Cir. 2006) ("[C]ustom license plates involve, at minimum, some private
speech." (citation omitted)): Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d
937, 945 n.9 (11th Cir. 2003) ("We fail to divine sufficient government
attachment to the messages on Florida specialty license plates to permit a
determination that the messages represent government speech.").
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quite different from those of either its creator
or its donor. 181
In contrast to the Fourth and Eighth Circuit's holdings, the
same is true with respect to specialty plates-the message that the
government conveys may be quite different from that of the
sponsoring organization or the motorists who voluntarily display
that specialty plate.'86  For example, after the North Carolina
legislature made specialty plates available to the public, it approved
both UNC-Chapel Hill and Duke license plates. Although certain
individuals, legislators, and the schools may have wanted to show
their pride in or support for their respective institutions, the
government as a whole did not advocate one school over another
even though individuals choosing a specific license plate might do
so." 7 That is, in adopting both specialty plates, the government is
185. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009). See
also id. (denying that "a monument can convey only one 'message'-which is,
presumably [under Respondent's argument], the message intended by the
donor-and that, if a government entity that accepts a monument for
placement on its property does not formally embrace that message, then the
government has not engaged in expressive conduct").
186. The passing comments of the Second and Eleventh Circuits, in an
unpublished decision and in dicta, respectively, that specialty plates involve
private speech are, therefore, unremarkable. Such comments simply reinforce
that which Summum states directly-that the government's intended message
may be significantly different from the meaning that a donor or those who
choose to display a specialty plate seek to send. The fact that the government
controls the message does not preclude others from using that message for
their own expressive purposes.
187. When a person sees a UNC-Chapel Hill license plate or a Duke
plate, that person may assume that the vehicle owner is saying something
about that institution -"I graduated from there" or "I support that school" -
which is part of the reason that the Court decided Wooley as it did. Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). In Wooley, the government could not force its
citizens to carry the government's message, so motorists were permitted to
cover up the motto "Live Free or Die" on the standard-issued license plate.
Id. at 720. But the Court did not hold that the State could not keep the motto
on its standard-issued license plate, let alone suggest that the motto could not
be on a specialty plate. Focusing on the compelled speech in Wooley, the
Court simply had no reason to address specialty plates, which involve a vehicle
owner's choosing to pay for and to place the specific specialty plate on her
vehicle. But, at a minimum, Wooley is important because it acknowledges that
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not saddled with (what many basketball observers might consider
to be) an inconsistent message: supporting both Duke and UNC-
Chapel Hill.x Instead, the government may convey a different
message, one about the State itself-pride in and support for (i) its
citizens who attended these schools and (ii) the rich educational
opportunities at North Carolina's institutions of higher learning."
Moreover, although state legislatures may approve specialty plates
for their own reasons, viewers of their specialty license plates (and
monuments) may interpret them in a variety of ways: "These text-
based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts
and sentiments in the minds of different observers, and the effect of
monuments that do not contain text is likely to be even more
variable." "'  Thus, under Summum the permanent Ten
Commandments monuments in Pioneer Park and on the Texas
Capitol grounds may "facilitate expressive conduct" by the
Fraternal Order of Eagles, which donated the monuments, while
still conveying a government-approved message.
the government speaks through its license plates even though motorists also
may.
188. In Johanns, the Court suggests in passing that the government might
lose the protection of the government speech doctrine if it sends an
inconsistent message. But the Court did not have to resolve that issue because
the government's messages regarding beef and dietary guidelines, like the
various specialty plates in most states, were consistent: "Even if we agreed that
the protection of the government-speech doctrine must be forfeited whenever
there is inconsistency in the message, we would nonetheless accord the
protection here. The beef promotions are perfectly compatible with the
guidelines' message of moderate consumption -the ads do not insist that beef
is also What's for Breakfast, Lunch, and Midnight Snack." Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 561 n.5 (2005).
189. At present, North Carolina offers more than twenty specialty plates
with the logos of North Carolina post-secondary institutions. See
http://www.ncdot.org/dmv/vehicle-services/licenseplates/specialized Req.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010). In addition, North Carolina offers five specialty
plates with the logos of post-secondary institutions from other states, which
may convey the message of the diverse educational backgrounds of North
Carolina's residents. See id. Of course, the facts of each case (i.e.. the reasons
that a state approves specific specialty plates) will determine what the actual
purpose of the specialty plate is and whether that purpose survives
constitutional review.
190. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135.
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Third, the "control" test does not necessarily convert every
public monument or specialty plate program into government
speech. If the government does not exercise the required level of
control over a specialty plate program or the selection of a
monument in a given situation, then it may not secure the
protection afforded by the government speech doctrine. Hence, the
Court notes in Summum that there may be situations, albeit rare
ones, where the government creates a forum for monuments in
public parks:
To be sure, there are limited circumstances in
which the forum doctrine might properly be
applied to a permanent monument-for
example, if a town created a monument on
which all of its residents (or those meeting
some other criterion) could place the name of a
person to be honored or some other private
191
message.
And the same is true for specialty license plate programs. If the
legislation creating a specialty plate program gives the sponsors of a
plate control over the content, symbols, and message of the plate
and requires the government to approve without modification every
proposed plate, then the program may create a forum along the
lines of Rosenberger.
9 2
For example, under Arizona's specialty license plate
program, an organization may submit an application for a specialty
plate to the Arizona Department of Transportation, which certifies
that the organization is a nonprofit and then forwards the
191. Id. at 1138.
192. The state might distance itself further from the sponsor's message
by expressly disclaiming responsibility for the messages on specialty plates, as
the University of Virginia did in Rosenberger: "The distinction between the
University's own favored message and the private speech of students is
evident in the case before us. The University itself has taken steps to ensure
the distinction in the agreement each [eligible student organization] must sign.
The University declares that the student groups eligible for [financial] support
are not the University's agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its
responsibility." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 834-35 (1995).
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application to the Arizona License Plate Commission.1"3 According
to the Ninth Circuit, the governing statute requires the License
Plate Commission to issue the requested specialty plate-with the
government's retaining only "de minimis editorial control over the
plate design and color."' 9 4 Under these circumstances, the Ninth
Circuit, applying Johanns and the SCV factors, determined that,
because the Arizona statutes "address[ed] who may speak, not what
they may say,"' 95 the sponsoring organizations and those "who
choose to purchase the plate [and] voluntarily choose to disperse
that message" 6 are the speakers. As a result, Arizona officials
could not invoke the government speech doctrine to insulate its
alleged viewpoint discrimination from review.197  But under
Summum, the creation of the forum is not predicated on a
reasonable observers determining that the government is not
speaking; rather, the forum is created by virtue of the governments
ceding actual control over the message to the public. If the Arizona
legislature has relinquished effective control over the specialty plate
program, the government speech doctrine does not apply.
Similarly, as the Eighth Circuit suggests, Missouri's specialty plate
program also may fall outside the government speech doctrine
because sponsoring organizations design the specialty plates and,
once approved, the DOR must produce the plate.'9" But even if
193. See Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir.
2008); ARIZ. REV, STAT. ANN. § 28-2404 (2004).
194. Stanton, 515 F.3d at 966.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 967.
197. Id. Because the Ninth Circuit determined that the messages on
Arizona specialty plates are private speech, the Arizona License Plate
Commission engaged in viewpoint discrimination by rejecting the Arizona
Life Coalition's application for a "Choose Life" specialty plate and, therefore,
violated the First Amendment.
198. Although the Eighth Circuit recognized that "under Johanns, the
more control the government has over the content of the speech, the more
likely it is to be government speech," the panel did not look closely at the level
of control that Missouri exercises over its specialty plate program. See Roach
v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2009). In applying the "reasonable
observer" test, the panel focused on who a reasonable person would identity
as the speaker. Id. at 868. But there may be reason to view Missouri's
specialty plates as government speech when viewed under the proper test.
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some specialty plate programs do not give rise to government
speech, other programs-like those in South Carolina and
Tennessee -do when viewed in light of Summum and Johanns.
D. The "I Believe" specialty plate is government speech under
Summum.
To determine whether South Carolina's specialty license
plate program constitutes government speech, one must apply the
appropriate test. The Sixth Circuit, relying on Johanns, held that
Tennessee's specialty plate program created government speech
and, therefore, fell outside the constraints imposed by the Free
Speech Clause. The district court in Summers followed Fourth
Circuit precedent and applied the SCV factors. Because Summum
and Johanns supplant the Fourth Circuit's four-factor analysis with
the "control" test, whether South Carolina's specialty plate
program is government speech depends on whether the South
Carolina legislature exercises the requisite level of control over the
program.
The level of control that the South Carolina legislature has
over the approval of specialty license plates, though, is similar to
that exercised by Tennessee in Bredesen. Under the governing
South Carolina statutes, the legislature controls all facets of the
specialty plate process, whether legislative or through the DMV.' 99
The South Carolina specialty plate program is authorized by
statute, and the general requirements for specialty plates are set
forth in the governing statutes. 21H The specific design, content, and
First, the legislature appears to have complete control over the legislative
process and can determine the design and content of a specialty plate through
the operative legislation. Second, even under the DOR process, the Joint
Committee has veto authority over all designs, id. at 867, which power Justice
Souter suggests was sufficient under the Johanns majority opinion. Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The
court takes the view that because Congress authorized this scheme and the
Government controls (or at least has a veto on) the content of the beef ads,
the need for democratic accountability has been satisfied.").
199. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000 (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
200. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 791 (4th Cir.
2004) ("Specialty license plates are a state-controlled medium of expression;
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message on each plate are approved by a government actor-either
the legislature directly2 1 or the DMV's Special Plate Review Panel.
Specialty plates that the State legislature approves directly are the
responsibility of the State. And, according to the DMV's own
policy, the same is true for DMV approved specialty plates:
Designs displayed on state license plates are
approved by the State . . . and are the sole
responsibility of the State. While the
Department can be flexible in considering a
range of potential specialty license plates, the
public must also be protected from state action
that might be construed as using taxpayer-
generated funding to create messages or
impressions that are not appropriate for a
governmental entity.
20 2
whatever speech is not authorized by the State is therefore prohibited."
(citation omitted)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(F) ("The joint legislative
committee may also review all license plates issued by the department and
instruct the department to cease issuing or renewing a plate it deems offensive
or fails to meet community standards.").
201. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8100 (2006 & West Supp. 2009). See also
Summers v. Adams, No. 3:08-2265-CMC, 2008 WL 5401537, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec.
23. 2008) (quoting the "I Believe" license plate statute, which states in relevant
part that "[tihe plate must contain the words 'I Believe' and a cross
superimposed on a stained glass window" and noting that the Act then
specifies the fee and the guidelines for production by incorporating the
requirements of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-3-8100).
202. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *7 (quoting DMV Policy RG-504).
The fact that a non-profit may propose a specialty plate design under the
DMV process is not materially different from the Fraternal Order of Eagles
donating the Ten Commandments monuments in Summum and Van Orden.
Although a third party provides the general design, the State still retains
ultimate control over the content and design. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen,
441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Thus, Tennessee's statutory law, and its
power to withdraw authorization for any license plate, gives the State the right
to wield 'final approval authority over every word used' on the 'Choose Life'
plate. As in Johanns, here Tennessee 'sets the overall message to be
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated' . . . . It is
Tennessee's own message."). Moreover, if the State adopts the design for a
monument or specialty plate, the government sends its own message. Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009) ("Just as government-
375
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The DMV's responsibility for organizational plates is apparent
from the fact that the DMV must ensure that the message is
"appropriate for a governmental entity."" 3  In particular, the
DMV's Special Plate Review Panel must determine that the
proposed specialty plate is "'appropriate,"' i.e., that it is not
"'offensive,"' and that it meets "'community standards of
propriety.""'2 " The Special Plate Review Panel can reject a
proposed specialty plate if it decides that the plate is
"'controversial, . . . or [subject to] litigation in other states,'
'partisan,' or 'potentially offensive, controversial, or inappropriate
to the public.'
205
Furthermore, both processes are subject to the legislative
review, either directly through legislation or through the legislative
review committee, which has veto power on all DMV-approved
specialty plates. The legislative review committee may "reverse[]
the department's decision . . . [and] may also review all license
plates issued by the department and instruct the department to
cease issuing or renewing a plate it deems offensive or fails to meet
community standards. 21 16  Thus, because "all special plates are
subject to final approval by the legislative committee, ,217 the South
Carolina legislature "'effectively controlled' the messages sent by
the [specialty plates] by exercising 'final approval authority' over
their selection," ' 5 production, and distribution to the motorists in
commissioned and government-financed monuments speak for the
government, so do privately financed and donated monuments that the
government accepts and displays to the public on government land.").
203. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *7 (quoting DMV Policy RG-504).
204. Id. at *4 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000).
205. Id.
206. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(F) (2006 & West Supp. 2009)
(alteration added).
207. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *4.
208. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009)
(alteration added) (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550,
560-61 (2005)). The South Carolina General Assembly and the legislative
review committee exercise the same level of control over specialty plates as
the Secretary of Agriculture and Congress exercised over the beef
advertisements that were found to be government speech in Johanns: "The
program is authorized and the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and
specific requirements for the promotions' content are imposed by federal
376 [Vol. 8
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South Carolina. Just as the Secretary of Agriculture had control
"over every word used in every promotional campaign, '119 the
South Carolina government-either through its DMV officials or
directly through the legislature-has final authority over (and has
approved only) those license plate designs "that it wants to display
for the purpose of presenting the image of the [State] that it wishes
to project. '' 2 "' Thus, because (i) the basic program and message are
set by South Carolina statute, (ii) the South Carolina legislature
oversees the program and retains complete authority over the
wording and approval of the specialty plates, and (iii) the South
Carolina legislature may reform the program at any time, "[n]o
more is required. ' 1 ' Specialty license plates, a fortiori, are
government speech.
Moreover, the South Carolina legislature does not forfeit
the protection of the government speech doctrine simply because
individual motorists associate themselves with a particular specialty
plate. By displaying specialty plates on their vehicles, motorists
212
may say something about themselves, their state, or some cause.
After all, the Fraternal Order of Eagles, which donated the Ten
Commandments monuments in Texas and in Pioneer Park, is
regulations promulgated after notice and comment. The Secretary of
Agriculture . . . oversees the program, appoints and dismisses the key
personnel, and retains absolute veto power over the advertisements' content,
right down to the wording. And Congress, of course, retains oversight
authority, not to mention the ability to reform the program at any time. No
more is required." Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563-64 (footnotes omitted) (alteration
added).
209. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 561.
210. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. Moreover, there appears to be no
evidence in the record indicating that South Carolina ever opened up its
license plates "for the placement of whatever [message] might be offered" by
private citizens or members of the legislature. Id. In fact, the Special Plate
Review Panel approves an organizational plate only if the Review Panel
determines that the design is "'appropriate' and meets "'community
standards of propriety,"' which indicates that specialty plates are not available
"for the placement of whatever [message] might be offered." Summers, 2008
WL 5401537. at *4 (quoting DMV Policy RG-504).
211. Johanns. 544 U.S. at 563-64 (footnote omitted) (alteration added).
212. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 126, at 97 (noting that specialty plates
contain "a mixture of government and private speech").
associated with each monument and conveys a message about its
organization and goals through its monuments. For First
Amendment purposes, though, Summum tells us that the
monuments are government speech because the government
adopted and displayed each monument for its own purposes. The
same holds true with specialty license plates. Because South
Carolina controls the message and motorists are not compelled to
display the message as in Wooley, the speech remains that of the
South Carolina legislature for purposes of First Amendment
analysis. As Summum notes, the government "may exercise this
same freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from
private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-
controlled message." '  Accordingly, the fact that a specialty plate
may be associated "at least partly with the vehicle owners"2t 4 (or
that one viewing the plate may not know about the government's
control and oversight of the process) does not change the fact that
the government is speaking.
But this fact undermines the district court's claim that
motorists bear the ultimate responsibility for specialty plates by
virtue of their choosing to associate themselves with the
government's message. Contrary to the district court's conclusion,
Johanns and Summum provide good grounds to believe that the
Fourth Circuit should (and the Supreme Court would) reach a
different result from Rose even though "the decision to purchase
the plate at issue is a matter of choice wholly within the discretion
of the vehicle owner., 215 Under Rust, Johanns, and Summum, the
fact that individuals agree to carry the government's message and
pay for the privilege to do so-regardless of whether they agree
with that message or seek to send their own message 2 6 -does not
213. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. See also Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (A government entity
may "regulate the content of what is or is not expressed ... when it enlists
private entities to convey its own message.").
214. Summers, 2008 WL 540137, at *16.
215. Id.
216. One also might view the government as a market participant, trying
to make its specialty plates attractive to motorists to get its message out and,
in the process, generate revenue for the State or for specific organizations that
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convert the speech into private or hybrid speech.1 7 Moreover,
neither Johanns, Summum, nor Hurley requires the government to
have direct and exclusive control over every part of a message from
beginning to end or to shun input from third parties: "Nor, under
our precedent, does First Amendment protection require a speaker
to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the
communication.""21 Rather, just as "privately financed and donated
monuments that the government accepts and displays to the public
on government land" speak for the government," 9 so do specialty
license plates that are proposed by non-profit groups or specific
legislators. Under Summum, the government may rely on third
parties to propose the design and wording of a specialty plate
without losing the protection of the government speech doctrine: 220
might benefit from the sale and that the government seeks to support. As the
Sixth Circuit notes in Bredesen, given that specialty plates do not confer any
special privileges on motorists, "[d]rivers' only motive for buying such plates,
therefore, must rest with the attractiveness of the 'Choose Life' message as
Tennessee has marketed it, not a desire to obey Tennessee's will." ACLU of
Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 374 (6th Cir. 2006).
217. Id. at 378 ("The doctors in Rust disagreed with the government's
anti-abortion policy. But if they had been true believers in the policy and had
volunteered to work in the program free of charge, the speech restrictions in
Rust would still have expressed the government's anti-abortion viewpoint-
and therefore qualified for government speech treatment.").
218. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995).
219. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009).
220. The Ninth Circuit attempts to distinguish Johanns on the grounds
that Johanns is a compelled subsidy case. Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515
F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008). In the specialty license plate context, so the
argument goes, Johanns does not apply because motorists voluntarily choose
to display such plates and are not forced to pay the government to support
someone else's message. According to the Ninth Circuit, the harm comes
from not being able to speak on the same terms as others in a forum, not from
a compelled subsidy. But Summum's "control" test precludes this line of
argument. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. In Summum, the Court concludes
that public monuments are government speech because, under Johanns, the
government has "effectively controlled" and "final approval authority" over
the selection of the monuments -even though there was no issue of compelled
subsidy. Id. See also Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 ("Johanns stands for the
proposition that when the government determines an overarching message
and retains power to approve every word disseminated at its behest, the
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"[The government] is not precluded from relying on the
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance
from nongovernmental sources in developing specific messages." '221
Similarly, the State remains the speaker, and therefore
remains covered by the government speech doctrine, even where
the government enlists third parties-whether volunteers or
subsidized participants in the government program-to disseminate
its message: "There is nothing in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Rust or Johanns that implies that the government has less right to
control expressions of its policies when it relies on unpaid private
people. No constitutionally significant distinction exists between
volunteer disseminators and paid disseminators.""2 For example,
the fact that motorists are willing to pay for specialty license plates
message must be attributed to the government for First Amendment
purposes."). To qualify as government speech, the government simply has to
have authority to regulate the message conveyed. But South Carolina's
specialty plate program fulfills this requirement-the legislature (either
directly or through the DMV and the legislative review committee) has
authority over each and every specialty plate and can cancel any specialty
plate at any time.
221. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
222. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 378. In Rust. the Court upheld Title X funding
to doctors for family planning counseling even though the recipients of such
funds could not discuss abortion related services with the program's patients.
The Court explained that "[wihen the government disburses public funds to
private entities to convey a governmental message. it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by
the grantee." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995). Thus, the federal government was allowed to pay third
parties to convey its preferred anti-abortion message. Nothing in the Court's
opinions in Rust or Rosenberger suggests that the government loses control
over its message simply because those promulgating the message (i) are not
subsidized but do so freely or (ii) agree with the government's message. Some
of the doctors in Rust may have shared the government's anti-abortion
message while others did not. But whether a third party who is willing to
assist the government agrees with the underlying message is not of
constitutional significance. The Court's focus in Johanns and Summum is on
the government's control over the message, not the observer's interpretation
of or agreement with that message. Provided the government retains
"effective control" and "final approval authority" over the message, it makes
no difference that the individuals volunteer (or pay a fee for the opportunity)
to carry the state controlled and approved message.
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does not convert the motorists into speakers for First Amendment
purposes. By voluntarily agreeing to carry the government-
approved message on their vehicles or otherwise,223 motorists do
not exercise any control over the government's decision to create
the plate or the content of the message. Thus, the use of third party
volunteers does not usurp the government's control over the
message: "[a] government entity may exercise this same freedom to
express its views when it receives assistance from private sources
for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.
224
As a result, specialty plates are "not a form of expression to which
forum analysis applies, 225 and the South Carolina legislature may
discriminate based on viewpoint.
226
Having the discretion to discriminate based on viewpoint is
important because it ensures that the State can get its message out
223. In this regard, specialty plates are similar to postage stamps, which
over the years have carried a wide variety of government messages relating to,
among other things, music, art, wars, Christmas, space exploration, and the
civil rights movement. The messages on stamps are those of the government
even though private individuals purchase those stamps and use them on their
letters or other mail. Consistent with Wooley, the government may not
require individuals to use specific stamps with specific messages, but
individuals can volunteer (and agree to pay) to use particular stamps if they
like the looks or message of a particular stamp. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 379.
224. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833
("[T]he government [may] regulate the content of what is or is not expressed.
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.").
225. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
226. The district court in Summers suggests that the differences between
the legislative and DMV processes also fosters viewpoint discrimination: "The
legislative process provided to those who espouse the views advanced by the 'I
Believe' plate is decidedly easier than and allows for options not available
through the DMV process. . . . [A]ny group forced to seek approval of a
religious (or non-religious philosophy) plate through the DMV is
disadvantaged in expressing its viewpoint .. " Summers v. Adams, No. 3:08-
2265-CMC, 2008 WL 5401537, at *17 (D.S.C. Dec. 23, 2008). Of course, if the
speech is government speech, it does not matter whether such differences
constitute viewpoint discrimination because the government, as speaker, is
permitted to discriminate based on viewpoint. Moreover, given that the entire
specialty plate program is subject to legislative review, the political process
provides the ultimate check on the entire program. Citizens who agree or
disagree with particular specialty plates can vote for legislators who share their
views and who can add or remove specific specialty plates.
to the public. Consistent with the way state and federal
governments have dealt with public monuments, the practice of
South Carolina and other States with respect to specialty plates
"has been one of selective receptivity." 227  Neither the South
Carolina legislature nor its DMV has approved any and all specialty
plates that have been proposed. As a result, the South Carolina
legislature has acted like the parade organizers in Hurley-
approving specific plate designs that further the government's
intended message while rejecting others:
Rather like a composer, the Council selects the
expressive units of the parade from potential
participants, and though the score may not
produce a particularized message, each
contingent's expression in the Council's eyes
comports with what merits celebration ....
[T]he Council clearly decided to exclude a
message it did not like from the communication
it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke
its right as a private speaker to shape its
expression by speaking on one subject while
remaining silent on another.
28
When the government acts as a speaker, it is free to determine what
merits celebration. Summum states this expressly with respect to
monuments, and the same holds true for specialty plates. License
plates, like public parks, "are often closely identified in the public
mind" with the state issuing the plates and may "play an important
role in defining the identity that a [state] projects to its own
residents and to the outside world., 229 In fact, unlike permanent
monuments, the images and words on a state's license plates are
carried far beyond the state's borders and may serve to send an
230)important and lasting impression about that state. The
227. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133.
228. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995).
229. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133-34.
230. Examples abound of States adopting license plate designs that
convey a message about their people, history, climate, or culture. Florida is
the Sunshine State, North Carolina is First in Flight, Illinois is the Land of
[Vol. 8382 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
2010] LICENSING RELIGIOUS GOV'T SPEECH
government's control over which specialty plates to approve,
therefore, serves the same function as a city's control over the
selection of monuments:
Government decisionmakers select the
monuments that portray what they view as
appropriate for the place in question, taking
into account such content-based factors as
esthetics, history, and local culture. The
monuments that are accepted, therefore, are
meant to convey and have the effect of
conveying a government message, and they
thus constitute government speech."'
As discussed above, under South Carolina's license plate statutes,
government decision-makers are charged with the responsibility of
making the same types of decisions with respect to the specialty
plates."' Just as "'municipalities generally exercise editorial control
over donated monuments through prior submission requirements,
design input, requested modifications, written criteria, and
legislative approvals of specific content proposals, ' '23 3 the South
Carolina legislature exercises the same scope and level of control
over specialty license plates. 3
Lincoln. Minnesota is the Land of 10,000 Lakes, Rhode Island is the Ocean
State, and the list goes on and on, especially if you include specialty plates.
For example, South Carolina offers specialty plates relating to a variety of
interests that the State seeks to promote, such as the Beaufort Water Festival,
Education, Driven by the Arts, First in Golf, H.L. Hunley, and Hunting Island
State Park. See S.C. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Plate Gallery,
http://www.scdmvonline.com/DMVNew/plategallery.aspx (last visited Feb. 19,
2010). Similar lists can be made for all 50 States.
231. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
232. See Summers v. Adams, No. 3:08-2265-CMC, 2008 WL 5401537, at
*4 (D.S.C. Dec. 23, 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000 (2006 & West Supp.
2009).
233. Summum 129 S. Ct. at 1133 (citation omitted).
234. For example, the South Carolina statutes relating to specialty plates
provide the government-through the DMV or the legislature itself-the
same editorial control over specialty plates. Pursuant to the South Carolina
specialty plate statutes, the legislative review committee and the DMV have
control over the submission requirements, design input, modifications, and
approval of specific content proposals. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *2.4.
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But the ability to discriminate based on viewpoint is
important for another reason as well. If the state is required to
accept and manufacture every specialty plate that private citizens or
groups request, it would lose control over the message it intends to
convey. In addition to honoring Veterans with a specialty plate, a
state also would have to permit plates for anti-war groups. Having
accepted a plate for one civic group, states would have to accept
specialty plates for the Ku Klux Klan. But such forced inclusion
would undermine the State's efforts to send specific messages about
the State:
Since every participating unit affects the
message conveyed by the private organizers,
the state courts' application of the statute
produced an order essentially requiring
petitioners to alter the expressive content of
their parade. . . . Under this approach any
contingent of protected individuals with a
message would have the right to participate in
[the organizers'] speech . . . [which would]
violate[] the fundamental rule of protection
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own
235
message.
Faced with messages that the government does not endorse and
that might reflect poorly on the state, state government officials
would have "little choice but to refuse all such" specialty plates and,
as a result, would lose its right to speak for itself and to convey its
235. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995).
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own message regarding the state. But Hurley, Johanns, and
Summum do not mandate any such outcome.
237
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the SCV factors apply
post-Summum, the district court's cursory review of the third and
fourth factors ignores its own findings regarding the level of control
that the South Carolina government exercises over specialty license
plates. As the district court expressly notes, the DMV's policy
states both that the State bears the sole responsibility for the
designs on specialty plates and that the State conveys its own
message through such plates: "Designs displayed on state license
plates are approved by the State... and are the sole responsibility of
the State .... [T]he public must also be protected from state action
that might be construed as using taxpayer-generated funding to create
messages or impressions that are not appropriate for a governmental
entity.' ' 38 Although a motorist may choose to display a specialty
plate because she agrees with the government's message or because
she adopts the plate for her own purposes, the government has
authority over the entire specialty plate program, including the
design, size, and wording of each specialty plate. As the district
court acknowledges, the legislature also exercises veto authority
over any and all specialty plates either directly or through the
legislative review committee, which may "reverse[] the
department's decision . . . [and] may also review all license plates
236. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138. See also Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573
(citations omitted) ("[Olne important manifestation of the principle of free
speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say,' ....
Indeed this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech,
applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally
to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.") (internal citations
omitted).
237. See, e.g., ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376-77 (6th Cir.
2006) (noting that Tennessee has approved plates for various respected
institutions but has not issued specialty plates "for groups of wide disrepute
such as the Ku Klux Klan or the American Nazi Party. Plaintiffs' position
implies that Tennessee must provide specialty plates for these hate groups in
order for it constitutionally to provide specialty plates supporting any
institution. Such an argument falls of its own weight.").
238. Summers v. Adams, No. 3:08-2265-CMC, 2008 WL 5401537, at *7
(D.S.C. Dec. 23, 2008) (quoting DMV Policy RG-504).
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issued by the department and instruct the department to cease
issuing or renewing a plate it deems offensive or fails to meet
community standards."23 9 Given the legislature's control over the
process, the government is the literal speaker (i.e., the entity
determining and expressing its message) and, as its DMV policy
states, bears ultimate responsibility for that message. Accordingly,
even under the third and fourth prongs of the Fourth Circuit's SCV
test, South Carolina's "I Believe" plate is government speech, not
hybrid speech as the district court contends.
IV. SUMMUM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE - WHY
FACIALLY RELIGIOUS GOVERNMENT SPEECH Is NOT SUBJECT TO
THE ENDORSEMENT TEST
Although government speech is not subject to the
limitations imposed by the Free Speech Clause, it is not free from
any and all restraints. In particular, the Court acknowledges that
"government speech must comport with the Establishment
Clause. 24  Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not say
anything else about the scope of the limitation that the
Establishment Clause imposes on government speech. All that we
know from Summum is that, given the level of control that the
government exercises over monuments in public parks, the
government "intends the monument to speak on its behalf." 41 Yet
if the government is speaking through a religiously themed
monument, such as a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments, the government might be viewed as engaging in
religious speech that would trigger Establishment Clause review.
So what happens when the government, acting as a speaker,
engages in facially religious speech? In particular, what does the
Establishment Clause say when the government approves a
specialty license plate with a picture of a cross superimposed on a
stained glass window and the words "I Believe"?
239. Id. at *7 n.15 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(F)).
240. Summum. 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
241. Id. at 1134.
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The government speech doctrine developed in Johanns and
Summum appears to place the government squarely in the horns of
a dilemma between the protection afforded by the Free Speech
Clause and the prohibition imposed by the Establishment Clause.
To fall within the government speech doctrine (and, therefore,
avoid the need to remain viewpoint neutral) the government must
have "effective control" over the message conveyed. But if the
government exercises such "final approval authority" over a
message that contains facially religious speech, the government
risks endorsing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
So the threshold question is whether the Establishment Clause
precludes government engagement in facially religious speech when
that speech is under its complete control. And, as Justice Scalia
suggests, Summum apparently was litigated with just this concern in
mind.242
But after Summum, the "dilemma" is not as ominous as it
might first appear. Through Summum, we know that public
monuments, such as the Ten Commandments monument on the
Texas State Capitol grounds, are government speech. Through Van
Orden, we know that the Ten Commandments monument on the
Texas Capitol grounds did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Thus, while there may be a threat of an Establishment Clause
violation whenever the government engages in facially religious
speech, there is no automatic violation-otherwise Van Orden and
Marsh v. Chambers would have turned out differently.2 43 Because
242. See, e.g., id. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("But it is also obvious
that from the start, the case has been litigated in the shadow of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause: the city wary of associating itself too
closely with the Ten Commandments monument displayed in the park, lest
that be deemed a breach in the so-called 'wall of separation between church
and State,' . . . ; respondent exploiting that hesitation to argue that the
monument is not government speech because the city has not sufficiently
,adopted' its message. Respondent menacingly observed that while the city
could have formally adopted the monument as its own, that 'might of course
raise Establishment Clause issues."') (internal citations omitted).
243. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 678 (2005) (holding that a
Ten Commandments monument did not violate the Establishment Clause
despite its apparent religious significance); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
786 (1983) (permitting prayer at the start of legislative sessions).
the government did not violate the Establishment Clause at all in
Van Orden, it necessarily did not violate the Establishment Clause
simply by approving the religiously themed Ten Commandments
monument. As a result, the government may engage in facially
religious speech under certain circumstances without violating the
Establishment Clause. The question then becomes under what
circumstances facially religious speech contravenes the
Establishment Clause. In particular, how should the Court
determine whether South Carolina's "I Believe" specialty plate
violates the Establishment Clause? We -courts, practitioners, and
academics-are left to consider how Summum affects the Court's
resolution of the dilemma going forward and which tests-
endorsement, coercion, and/or no primary religious purpose-the
Court will apply.
A. Summers takes the "I Believe" plate to constitute an
impermissible endorsement of religion.
In enjoining the production and distribution of the "I
Believe" plate on Establishment Clause grounds, the district court
in Summers did not rely on Van Orden but instead invoked a
different line of cases. According to the district court, the central
issue in Summers with respect to the Establishment Clause was
"whether the 'I Believe' plate constitutes a constitutionally
prohibited state-sponsored religious display. 2 44 By framing the
issue in this way, the district court connected the "I Believe" plate
to the Supreme Court's "display" cases, such as Lynch v.
Donnelly,245 in which Justice O'Connor started articulating the
246features of her endorsement test. A majority of the Court
adopted the endorsement test in County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union, retaining the key features of Justice
244. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *5.
245. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (holding that a
Christmas display that included a creche as well as other traditional holiday
symbols such as reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, a
teddy bear, and hundreds of colored lights, did not violate the Establishment
Clause).
246. Id. at 689-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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O'Connor's formulation.247 The inquiry under the endorsement
test 248 is whether the government action signals to observers that
the government is conveying a message of endorsement. If a
reasonable observer, aware of the history and context surrounding
the government action, would view that action as conveying a
message that the government favors (or disfavors) religion, then the
action violates the Establishment Clause.249  That is, the
247. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989). Although
the district court focuses on the endorsement test, it begins its Establishment
Clause analysis with the three-factored test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971). As has been well documented, the Lemon test has been
the object of much criticism from within and without the Court. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("I have
to this point assumed the validity of the Lemon 'purpose' test. In fact,
however, I think the pessimistic evaluation that THE CHIEF JUSTICE made
of the totality of Lemon is particularly applicable to the 'purpose' prong: it is
,a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of the amendment it
seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results ... '
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)). A review of these criticisms goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, I focus on the endorsement test on which the district court relies
extensively.
248. Although the first and second prongs of the Lemon test are similar,
they are conceptually distinct. Yet the district court appears to conflate the
two. Having held that several legislators had a primarily religious purpose in
sponsoring the "I Believe" Act, the court invokes the legislative history once
again to show endorsement. The district court notes that two legislators
introduced the bill, which was unanimously approved, and that the Lieutenant
Governor stated on his state website that the "'I Believe' plate reflects core
values that are meaningful to our society." Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at
*13. Whereas the former fact by itself fails to speak to an impermissible
religious purpose, the latter statement may provide a secular basis for the "I
Believe" specialty plate-the message that Christianity and certain values
espoused by that religion have been and may continue to be important in
South Carolina history. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (noting that legislative prayers
often are an "acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of
this country.").
249. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (holding that the
Establishment clause "preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting
to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred" (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 79 (O'Connor, J. concurring)
(emphasis omitted)).
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endorsement test focuses on the government's message as
determined by a hypothetical reasonable observer.
In applying the endorsement test, the district court suggests
that, although any facially religious specialty plate may fail
Establishment Clause review," " a specialty plate that is sponsored
and authorized by the legislature "is clearly more offensive to the
Establishment Clause than a plate sponsored by a non-
governmental non-profit organization. 25 ' The district court bases
this conclusion on the premise that in sponsoring facially religious
speech, such as the "I Believe" specialty plate, the government
permits the speech for its overtly religious content. Specifically, the
district court emphasizes that the government sends a message that
the State approves of this particular religious group: "This is
because legislative authorization signals the state's affirmation,
promotion, advancement, and endorsement of the referenced
religion (Christianity). 2 52 The key factor for the district court is
the government's "signaling" to a reasonable observer that the
State favors one religion over others or non-religion: "legislative
authorization of this plate (and no other religious plate) signals that
the referenced religion is uniquely worthy of legislative
endorsement., 253  Having chosen one religion for special
recognition or promotion, the government "sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community., 254 Just as the State promotes tourism to third parties
250. See, e.g., Summers. 2008 WL 5401537, at *7 ("All state-issued plates
are, therefore, subject to review under the Establishment Clause. Whether a
plate sponsored by a non-profit religious organization and approved by the
DMV would survive such a challenge is beyond the scope of this action. It is,
however, fair to predict that such a challenge might raise constitutional
questions, particularly given that the policies for issuance of such plates may
be said to favor established 'majority' religions.").
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
254. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). For example, the district court notes that "Plaintiffs find such
endorsement offensive for a variety of reasons including, as to some of them,
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by printing "Travel2SC.com" on its standard-issue license plate, so
too the State promotes Christianity by creating and distributing the
"I Believe" specialty plate. 255 Thus, given the expressly religious
nature of the "I Believe" plate, the district court contends that "a
reasonable, objective observer would likely consider that a state-
issued license plate carries the endorsement of the state. 2 56 The "I
Believe" plate, therefore, violates the Establishment Clause.
B. Summum's control test precludes application of the endorsement
test to facially religious go vernment speech.
The purpose of this section is to begin exploring the
interaction between the government speech doctrine and the
Establishment Clause and to see how this "recently minted" speech
doctrine alters the Court's Establishment Clause analysis. In
particular, I focus on South Carolina's "I Believe" specialty plate,
which (as I argue above) is government speech under Summum.
Whereas the district court took the Free Speech and Establishment
Clause inquiries to be separate and distinct, I contend that after
Summum, the Free Speech inquiry is logically prior to the
Establishment Clause inquiry. One must know whether the speech
is government speech to know which Establishment Clause test to
apply. If the government is speaking and controls the content of its
that it suggests their chosen religion is less favored than the particular
Christian denominations which might approve of and be represented by the 'I
Believe' plate." Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *10.
255. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *13.
256. Id. Interestingly, to support this claim, the district court cites to the
DMV policy RG-504. The policy states that: "Designs displayed on state
license plates are approved by the State for display to all audiences on the
public highways and are the sole responsibility of the State." SOUTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, POLICY RG-504 SPECIALIZED
PLATES FOR ORGANIZATIONS (2009), available at http://www.scdmvoline.com/
dmvnew/forms/RG-504.pdf. Under Summum, the fact that specialty plates are
the "sole responsibility" of the State reinforces the view that such plates are
government speech such that the government has control over the message
and may send its preferred message even though others may interpret that
message in various ways. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125,
1133 (2009).
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own message, the endorsement test, upon which the district court in
Summers relied so heavily, does not apply.
Although questioning the viability of the endorsement test
in relation to government speech may sound sacrilegious, it is not as
radical as it may first appear. In fact, Justice O'Connor, who
crafted the endorsement test, expressly acknowledged that not all
of the Court's Establishment Clause tests apply to every alleged
Establishment Clause violation: "Experience proves that the
Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be
reduced to a single test." '257 And this is consistent with the Court's
practice, applying specific tests in certain situations but not
others.25 Accordingly, there should be nothing alarming about a
specific Establishment Clause test, which was developed in the
context of display cases, not applying in a different context, namely,
government speech: "The Court today does only what courts must
do in many Establishment Clause cases-focus on specific features
of a particular government action to ensure that it does not violate
the Constitution."25 9 That the government speech doctrine creates
a situation to which the endorsement test does not apply, therefore,
is simply an instantiation of the general rule that not all
Establishment Clause tests apply to all circumstances.
1. The reasonable observer test is inconsistent with the
government's right to determine its own message.
To understand why the endorsement test does not apply to
government speech, one must recall the Free Speech foundation of
the doctrine. Under Summum, the government, as speaker, has the
right to "say what it wants" without regard for the viewpoints of
257. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
258. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 299, 307, 311 (2000)
(applying the no endorsement test, the no primary religious purpose test, and
the coercion test); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (applying the
coercion test); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (developing and
applying the Lemon test).
259. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
852 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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others. Because the government has "effective control" over the
content of the speech, it need not worry about the objections of
those who disagree with its message. The government may
communicate its message even if others disagree with or
misunderstand that message -subject, of course, to the constraints
imposed by the Establishment Clause and the political process.
But, as Summum explains, the government's intended message may
differ significantly from how others interpret that message: "These
text-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different
thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different observers, and
the effect of monuments that do not contain text is likely to be even
more variable.
2g)
At a general level, then, the endorsement test does not
mesh well with facially religious government speech because it
focuses on the wrong person in the communicative process-the
observer instead of the speaker.16 1 Instead of analyzing what is
critical in the government speech context-the government's
intended message-the endorsement test considers the message
that a reasonable observer, who is aware of the history and context,
would attribute to the government. In so doing, the endorsement
test presupposes a premise that Summum rejects-that the
government's message can be determined by the meaning that
others attribute to the government, i.e., as Summers puts it, the
meaning that the legislature "signals" to others.262 Contrary to the
260. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135.
261. In County of Allegheny, the Court held that a creche on the grand
staircase of a government building constituted an endorsement of religion. 492
U.S. 573, 579 (1989). Although it applied the endorsement test, the Court did
not consider the effect of the government speech doctrine on its Establishment
Clause analysis. Under the view developed in this section, if the cr6che was
government speech, then it still may have violated the Establishment Clause,
but the inquiry would be whether the government had an impermissible
primary purpose of establishing religion, not how a reasonable observer might
interpret (or misinterpret) the government's message.
262. Moreover, even if the endorsement test applies to government
speech, the district court fails to apply the test properly. Under the
endorsement test, one does not look at the specific legislative authorization in
isolation; rather, one must consider the message sent within the context of the
larger specialty plate program. For example, in County of Allegheny, the
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district court's view, though, Summum recognizes that "it
frequently is not possible to identify a single 'message' that is
conveyed by an object or structure, and consequently, the thoughts
or sentiments expressed by a government entity that accepts and
displays such an object may be quite different from those of either
its creator or its donor.,1 63  Similarly, an observer (even a
reasonable one) might attribute a variety of different meanings to
the government, as the Court acknowledges in its discussion of
"Imagine" in New York City.' 64 Given that monuments "evoke
different thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different
observers," whether government speech violates the Establishment
Clause must be determined by looking at what the government
intended, not at how others interpret (or misinterpret) it.165 After
all, when speaking the government "has the right 'to speak for
itself' . . . and to select the views that it wants to express. 2 66 That is,
Court distinguished the multifaceted display in Lynch from the solitary creche
display on the grand staircase: "[T]he effect of a creche display turns on its
setting.... The Lynch display comprised a series of figures and objects, each
group of which had its own focal point.... Here, in contrast, the creche stands
alone: it is the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase." County
of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598.
263. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136 ("By accepting such a monument, a
government entity does not necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any
particular donor sees in the monument.").
264. Id. at 1135.
265. Id. The concern that I have here is reflected in Justice Scalia's
criticism of the majority opinion in McCreary. See McCreary County v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 901 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the no
primary religious purpose test is not consistent with the reasonable observer
test because "the legitimacy of a government action with a wholly secular
effect would turn on the misperception of an imaginary observer that the
government officials behind the action had the intent to advance religion.").
Of course, Justice Scalia is not a supporter of the Lemon test generally or the
purpose prong in particular. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636
(1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting that the Lemon "purpose" test is not
derived from the history of the First Amendment nor is its application useful).
Yet the Court has repeatedly used the no primary religious test, and, as I
argue above, Summum requires its application in the government speech
context.
266. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)).
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it has the right to accept and display a particular specialty plate or
monument "for the purpose of presenting the image of the [State]
that it wishes to project to all who" view it. 67 Thus, under Summum,
the focus is not on what a monument may "signal" to the donor or
observer of a religiously-themed monument but on the
government's reasons for approving the monument and displaying
it in a public park.
Yet there is another reason why the "reasonable observer"
test is an improper lens through which to judge whether
government speech violates the Establishment. 4 If a court
requires the government to convey only those messages that a
reasonable observer would view as neutral towards religion, the
government loses the "right to 'speak for itself."' Instead of
"say[ing] what it wishes, 269 the government is forced to filter its
speech to account for how the reasonable observer might interpret
the message-even though, as Summum states, such an observer
may interpret the message differently from how the government
intended. For example, in Van Orden, the plurality held that there
was no Establishment Clause violation because Texas agreed to
display the Ten Commandments monument to convey an historical
267. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
268. In Summum, Pleasant Grove City stated that "its practice was to
limit monuments in the Park to those that 'either (1) directly relate to the
history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding
ties to the Pleasant Grove community."' Id. at 1130. The City ultimately
passed a resolution that formalized this policy and made it express. Id. Thus,
given these secular reasons for adopting monuments-whether religiously
themed, such as the Ten Commandments, or not-the City's message did not
violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
city ought not fear that today's victory has propelled it from the Free Speech
Clause frying pan into the Establishment Clause fire. Contrary to
respondent's intimations, there are very good reasons to be confident that the
park displays do not violate any part of the First Amendment.").
269. Id. at 1131 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). See also Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)
(noting that "a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message").
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message." "  The dissenting Justices argued that there was an
Establishment Clause problem because a reasonable observer
would view the monument as an endorsement of religion.:' But, as
the split among the Justices demonstrates, reasonable observers-
in this case, the Justices on the Court-may attribute different
messages to the government, all of which may differ from the
government's intended message. Accordingly, if the government
must worry about how third party observers interpret its message,
then it loses effective control over its own message. But this
undermines the foundation of the government speech doctrine
itself. Instead of the government's dictating the content of its own
message, the government must adapt its message to account for
how a third-party reasonable observer would interpret that
message.
Put differently, Summum tells us that government speech
falls outside the Court's traditional forum analysis, thereby altering
both the Free Speech and Establishment Clause analyses. In a
forum opened up to expressive conduct by private persons, the
government is not speaking. Rather, the government serves as a
monitor or forum-regulator that cannot discriminate based on
content and/or viewpoint (depending on the nature of the forum):
When a university requires its students to pay
fees to support the extracurricular speech of
other students, all in the interest of open
discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints
to others . . . . Viewpoint neutrality is the
justification for requiring the student to pay the
fee in the first instance and for ensuring the
integrity of the program's operation once the
funds have been collected."'
Having opened the forum to others, the government is not allowed
to skew the debate." Because the government is not itself
270. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688-89 (2005).
271. Id. at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
272. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233.
273. This also explains why the government is not allowed to engage in
viewpoint discrimination in a traditional or designated public forum. Because
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engaging in expressive conduct in a forum, it has no right to control
the message of private speakers in the forum. The government,
therefore, must remain neutral between and among the private
speakers that use the forum. Given that the government's intent is
not controlling, the Court considers whether a reasonable and fully
informed observer would take the government action to convey a
message of endorsement, i.e., a message that religion or a particular
sect is preferred.274
As a speaker, though, the government can engage in
content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination,275 selecting its
the government has opened up the forum to public discourse on some or
possibly all topics, the government is not allowed to restrict subsequent speech
in ways that are inconsistent with the purported scope of the forum:
"Accordingly, the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that
important purpose of the Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government
from skewing public debate. Other things being equal, viewpoint
discrimination occurs when government allows one message while prohibiting
the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to respond."
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 894 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti. 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) ("Especially where ... the
legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people,
the First Amendment is plainly offended."); Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v.
Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n. 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976) ("To permit
one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its
views.., is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees.").
274. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630, 635-36
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting
that a crbche and menorah placed in Pittsburgh did not have the effect of
endorsing either Christianity or Judaism).
275. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131-32 (setting out the traditional rules
governing public fora and contrasting those rules with the government speech
doctrine pursuant to which the government may "'say what it wishes,' . . . and
... select the views that it wants to express") (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 833). See also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235, in which the Court distinguishes
government speech from the viewpoint neutrality requirement governing
student fees used to support the extracurricular speech of other students as
part of a designated forum: "Where the University speaks, either in its own
name through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its
diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. The Court
has not held, or suggested, that when the government speaks the rules we have
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own message without providing equal access to other viewpoints on
the same topic: "A government entity has the right ... to select the
views that it wants to express., 276 But given that the government
may discriminate based on viewpoint, it is not surprising that a third
party observer-even a reasonable one-might think that her
viewpoint and her standing in the community is being ignored (or
that another viewpoint is being advanced). That just is the
"benefit" that the government seeks by engaging in its own
speech-the ability to advance its own views and policies free from
a "heckler's veto." Because the government does not create a
forum when speaking, the government may craft its message to
communicate "the image of the [State] that it wishes to project 277
regardless of how a reasonable observer subsequently interprets
that message.
2. The no primary religious purpose test is a substantive check
on facially religious government speech.
Of course, one might wonder whether the government
speech doctrine renders the Free Speech analysis co-extensive with
the Establishment Clause analysis when the government engages in
facially religious speech. A finding that facially religious speech is
government speech would end the Establishment Clause inquiry
because, so the argument goes, the government as speaker is free to
discriminate based on viewpoint, even religious viewpoint. In fact,
Justice Souter suggests that the Court might adopt such a position
in his concurrence in Summum:
But the government could well argue, as a
development of government speech doctrine,
that when it expresses its own views, it is free of
the Establishment Clause's stricture against
discussed [regarding viewpoint neutrality] come into play." Id. (citation
omitted).
276. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (internal citations omitted); Nat'l
Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment) ("It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor
points of view....").
277. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
398 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 8
2010] LICENSING RELIGIOUS GOV'T SPEECH
discriminating among religious sects or groups.
Under this view of the relationship between the
two doctrines, it would be easy for a
government to favor some private religious
speakers over others by its choice of
monuments to accept.
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Under Justice Souter's proposal, the government would have broad
discretion not only to choose which message to convey but also to
promote religion or one sect over another.2 9
Yet there are at least two reasons to doubt that the Court
will adopt such a position post-Summum. First, permitting the
government intentionally to favor one religious group over another
contradicts the explicit holding in Summum that the Establishment
Clause restrains government speech. Under Justice Souter's
proposal, the government could advance whatever religious view
that it wanted-free from the strictures of the Free Speech and
Religion Clauses-provided only that it controlled the message and
engaged in expressive activity. But this broad authority undermines
the Court's view in Summum that government speech must
comport with the Establishment Clause, and the Court, therefore, is
apt to reject this line of argument. Second, this line of reasoning is
inconsistent with how the Court has handled cases, such as Van
278. Id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring).
279. Justice Souter acknowledges that the Court leaves open, and leaves
us to speculate about, the contours of the Establishment Clause restrictions on
government speech: "It is simply unclear how the relatively new category of
government speech will relate to the more traditional categories of
Establishment Clause analysis, and this case is not an occasion to speculate."
Id. Undaunted, though, Justice Souter proceeds to proffer a test for
government speech-a reasonable observer test-that "is of a piece with" the
endorsement test: "[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a
reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the expression to be
government speech, as distinct from private speech the government chooses to
oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public land." Id.
According to Justice Souter, one benefit of this test is that "it would thus serve
coherence within Establishment Clause law," thereby suggesting strongly that,
even though we do not know the exact contours of the government speech
doctrine's effect on the Establishment Clause, the government speech doctrine
does not supplant the endorsement test. Id. Because the endorsement test
does not apply, the symmetry that Justice Souter seeks is illusory.
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Orden, where the Court has allowed government speech that may
appear facially religious to a third-party observer. In Van Orden,
the Court did not say that the Ten Commandments monument was
constitutional because the government could discriminate against
other religions. Instead, the majority looked to see if the
government had a secular or non-religious reason for displaying the
monument. Where, as in Van Orden, a secular reason serves as the
impetus for the government's facially religious speech, there is no
Establishment Clause violation. But the Court did not suggest, let
alone hold, that the government may engage in facially religious
speech for the express purpose of promoting certain religious view
or speakers over others.
Thus, the government speech doctrine, while incompatible
with the endorsement test, does not render the Establishment
Clause superfluous with respect to government speech.181 Rather,
by stating that "government speech must comport with the
Establishment Clause,"2 Summum imposes a substantive check on
government speech that is separate and distinct from the Court's
Free Speech analysis. Because government speech falls outside the
Court's forum analysis, the Court must focus on the government's
intent, i.e., the reasons why the government conveyed a facially
religious message, to determine whether it had a permissible secular
purpose. Although "a union of government and religion tends to
280. Not all of the Justices have embraced the endorsement test, which is
yet another reason why a majority of the current Court may be inclined not to
apply the test to government speech. In fact, the dissenters in County of
Allegheny expressly rejected the test, arguing that it reflected "an unjustified
hostility toward religion." 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part). In its place, the dissenters argued for
a more limited test: "government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in
such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so."' Id. at 659. But "[nloncoercive government action within the
realm of flexible accommodation or passive acknowledgement of existing
symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion in
a way more direct and more substantial than practices that are accepted in our
national heritage." Id. at 662-63.
281. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
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destroy government and to degrade religion, 2 2 Van Orden
indicates that the government may engage in facially religious
speech without, ipso facto, creating such an impermissible union. In
fact, where the government engages in facially religious speech for
non-religious reasons, the requirements of the Establishment
Clause are met.
Because the government is no longer merely facilitating
speech but engaging in it, the operative question shifts from who is
speaking-private party or the government-to what message did
the government intend to convey:
If there is to be assurance that the
Establishment Clause retains its force in
guarding against those governmental actions it
was intended to prohibit, we must in each case
inquire first into the purpose and object of the
governmental action in question and then into
the practical details of the program's
operation.""
The investigation into the "purpose and object" of facially religious
government speech is just an inquiry into the intent behind the
government's message. And although the endorsement test is not
well suited for this task, the Court's no primary religious purpose
test is. Under this test, the government may not engage in facially
religious speech if the "pre-eminent purpose" is religiousM
Because the no primary religious purpose test focuses on whether
the government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove
religion, it tracks the distinguishing feature of the government
speech doctrine-the government's right to determine its own
message. Thus, as a speaker, the government violates the
Establishment Clause not simply by engaging in facially religious
speech but by engaging in such speech for the purpose of promoting
or advancing religion. That is, facially religious government speech
violates the Establishment Clause only when the government
282. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
283. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
838-39 (1995).
284. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
expressly adopts facially religious speech as its own and does so for
religious reasons.
As a result, to survive Establishment Clause review, the
government must have a non-religious reason for engaging in the
facially religious speech. But not any proffered secular justification
is sufficient. As the Court held in Edwards, the government's
proposed justification must "be sincere and not a sham."2 5  In
Edwards, the Court struck down Louisiana's Balanced Treatment
for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School
Instruction Act because it concluded that "[t]he preeminent
purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the
religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created
humankind., 2 6 In contrast, the plurality in Van Orden held that
the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas Capitol grounds
did not violate the Establishment Clause because it had "'an
undeniable historical meaning' in addition to [its] 'religious
significance.""'2 7  Thus, as these cases demonstrate, to survive
Establishment Clause review, the government speaker must not
engage in facially religious speech with the primary purpose of
advocating the religious component of the speech.
Under Summum, then, the constitutionality of the "I
Believe" plate hinges on the intent of the South Carolina
legislature, not on the endorsement test, as the district court in
Summers thought. Accordingly, the lower court's reliance on
McCreary is misplaced. 2 " Although the Court held the Ten
Commandments display unconstitutional in McCreary, it did so
based on the government's having an impermissible primary
religious purpose. The Court stated that "[w]hen the government
285. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987).
286. Id. at 591.
287. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1140 (2009)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005)).
288. Summers v. Adams, No. 3:08-2265-CMC, 2008 WL 5401537, at *12
(D.S.C. Dec. 23, 2008) ("There are, however, numerous cases suggesting that
government action of a similar nature violates the Establishment Clause.").
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that Ten
Commandment displays in Kentucky courthouses were impermissible
endorsement of religion).
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acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing
religion, it violates th[e] central Establishment Clause value of
official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the
government's ostensible object is to take sides. ' ' 2"9 But the majority
in McCreary went on to conflate the primary purpose inquiry and
the reasonable observer test. Because a reasonable observer would
view the iteration of Ten Commandments displays at the
courthouse as demonstrating a "continuing religious object," the
Court found the displays unconstitutional. 2" The problem is that
the two inquiries are conceptually distinct:
Because in the Court's view the true danger to
be guarded against is that the objective
observer would feel like an "outside[r]" or "not
[a] full membe[r] of the political community,"
its inquiry focuses not on the actual purpose of
government action, but the "purpose apparent
from the government action." Under this
approach, even if a government could show
that its actual purpose was not to advance
religion, it would presumably violate the
Constitution as long as the Court's objective
observer would think otherwise. 9'
Although the government may be said to endorse religion
when it acts with a primarily religious purpose, the Court, not a
reasonable observer, must determine whether the government's
actual motive was improper. Thus, the reasonable observer test is
separate from the no primary religious motive test, even though
courts sometimes use "endorsement" to refer to both.
With respect to the "I Believe" specialty plate in South
Carolina, there is no doubt that the government speech is facially
religious. The Establishment Clause claim, therefore, centers on
whether the South Carolina legislature had a primarily religious
motive for adopting this plate. The inquiry into the government's
intent requires the Court to look at the actual intent, not the intent
289. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860.
290. Id. at 848.
291. Id. at 900-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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of the sponsor of a specialty plate. Even though the Fraternal
Order of Eagles may have had expressly religious reasons for
donating the monument, the Van Orden Court did not
automatically attribute those religious reasons to the government.
Rather, a majority of the Court-the plurality and Justice Breyer-
recognized that the government might have non-religious reasons
for displaying such Judeo-Christian monuments.2 And Summum
suggests that a majority of the current Court is likely to sympathize
with the plurality's opinion in Van Orden. Since Van Orden, Justice
Alito, the author of the primary opinion in Summum, replaced
Justice O'Connor, one of the dissenters in Van Orden. Thus, if
Justice Alito agrees with the accommodationists on the Court that
facially religious speech may have "an undeniable historical
meaning," then there are five Justices who think that the
Establishment Clause permits the government to engage in facially
religious speech so long as it has a permissible secular motive.
Moreover, if a legislator or a non-profit group proposes, and
the legislature subsequently adopts, a specialty plate that contains a
facially religious symbol or message, Summum precludes imputing
that impermissible religious message to the government without
evidence that the government entity had a primarily religious
motivation in adopting the specialty plate:2 93
292. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
writing for plurality) (holding that the Ten Commandments monument did
not violate the Establishment Clause because the Ten Commandments "have
an undeniable historical meaning" as well as their "religious significance");
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130 (noting that the City had a policy limiting
monuments in the Park to those relating to the City's history or donated by
groups with longstanding ties to the community).
293. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136. Under South Carolina's specialty
license plate program, 400 individuals must sign up to purchase a particular
plate before production is started. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8100 (2006 & West
Supp. 2009). These 400 participants in the program are similar to the
numerous private donors that may contribute to a private monument that is
subsequently donated to the government. Although each of the
participants/donors may ascribe a certain meaning to the plate/monument, the
government might not endorse any one of their intended messages: "[W]hen a
privately donated memorial is funded by many small donations, the donors
themselves may differ in their interpretation of the monument's significance.
By accepting such a monument, a government entity does not necessarily
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[A] painting of a religious scene may have been
commissioned and painted to express religious
thoughts and feelings. Even if the painting is
donated to the museum by a patron who shares
those thoughts and feelings, it does not follow
that the museum, by displaying the painting,
intends to convey or is perceived as conveying
the same "message.,
294
Just as a public museum may accept and display a "religious"
painting without violating the Establishment Clause, so too may the
government approve and distribute a facially religious license plate,
such as the "I Believe" plate, without violating the First
Amendment. Otherwise, the government's acceptance and display
of the Ten Commandment monuments in Van Orden would have
created an Establishment Clause violation. But it did not.
Similarly, although Wide Awake engaged in overtly religious
speech in the limited forum created at the University of Virginia, it
is possible that the State could have adopted Wide Awake's speech
without "endorsing" or promoting religion (e.g., if it had a secular
reason for including this speech as part of its own message). 291 If,
however, the State adopted the religious speech for the purpose of
endorse the specific meaning that any particular donor sees in the monument."
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136.
294. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136 n.5.
295. Here again, the claim is only that it is conceptually possible under
Summum and Van Orden that the State could adopt facially religious speech
for one or more non-religious reasons. After all, even though Wide Awake's
materials expressed a distinctly Christian viewpoint, the same was said about
the Ten Commandments monuments, which continue to be displayed on the
Texas Capitol grounds and in Pioneer Park. Yet the Court held that the
monument in Van Orden did not violate the Establishment Clause, and there
is good reason to assume that the Court would hold the same with respect to
the similar monument in Pioneer Park. See, e.g., id. at 1140 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Even accepting the narrowest reading of the narrowest opinion
necessary to the judgment in Van Orden, there is little basis to distinguish the
monument in this case . . . . The city can safely exhale. Its residents and
visitors can now return to enjoying Pioneer Park's wishing well, its historic
granary-and, yes, even its Ten Commandments monument-without fear
that they are complicit in an establishment of religion.").
promoting or advancing religion, then the State would violate the
no primary religious purpose test.
Of course, whether the South Carolina legislature had a
primarily religious purpose is a factual inquiry that the district court
did not undertake in any level of detail. Instead of analyzing the
possible secular purposes with which the legislature might have
acted, the district court appears to take the "very appearance of the
plate, with its Christian symbols and images, and the corresponding
words 'I Believe"' to violate the Establishment Clause.296 In
support of its position, the district court cites to a Fourth Circuit
case, Mellen v. Bunting, for the proposition that "[w]hen a state-
sponsored activity has an overtly religious character, courts have
consistently rejected efforts to assert a secular purpose for that
activity. 29 7 Given the expressly religious nature of the "I Believe"
plate, the district court rejects the State's claim that the purpose of
the "I Believe" specialty plate is "'to provide South Carolina
motorists with another message that they can elect to convey when
selecting from over one hundred available specialty license
plates."'298 According to the lower court, the facially religious
296. Summers v. Adams, No. 3:08-2265-CMC, 2008 WL 5401537, at *12
(D.S.C. Dec. 23, 2008).
297. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 373 (4th Cir. 2003).
298. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *12 (quoting Defendants'
Responsive Brief to Motion for Preliminary Injunction). The State's alleged
purpose might suggest that the specialty license plate forum is a designated
limited forum designed to permit motorists to convey their own messages.
But, as discussed above, the South Carolina legislature retains complete
control over the content and display of the message, which under Summum
and Johanns makes the speech government speech. Under Summum, a State
legislature might contend more effectively that each specialty plate that is
approved is part of a larger message regarding the history and beauty of the
State and/or the diversity and accomplishments of its citizenry. In this way,
the legislature could argue that specialty plates are like monuments in that
"[g]overnment decisionmakers select the [specialty plates] that portray what
they view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into account such
content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture . . . . The
[government] has selected those [license plates] that it wants to display for the
purpose of presenting the image of the [State] that it wishes to project to all
who" see the specialty license plates. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (discussing
the monuments in public parks at issue in that case). If the government
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nature of the specialty plate is sufficient to create an Establishment
Clause violation. The fact that the "I Believe" plate includes a
Latin cross on a stained glass window serves only to magnify the
nature of that violation: "Although any such message would likely
violate the Establishment Clause, the legislature's decision to select
a single (majority) religion for such treatment exacerbates the
violation."2 99
Contrary to the district court's analysis, though, the no
primary religious purpose test does not preclude any and all facially
religious speech, which is why the "overtly and singularly religious
nature" of the Ten Commandments monument did not give rise to
an Establishment Clause violation in Van Orden. With respect to
the "I Believe" plate, the district court must look beyond the
appearance of the plate to consider the legislative purpose.
Although, as the Supreme Court has recognized, determining
legislative intent is a difficult business,""' the Supreme Court has
undertaken such analysis in the past,3 " and Summum now requires
lower courts to do so when the government speech doctrine is
disclaimed the message and gave its motorists authority to design and to
display their own messages, then the case would be much closer to
Rosenberger, in which a limited forum was created and the government lacked
"effective[] control[]" and "final approval authority." Id. But such is not the
case in South Carolina, where the government-through the General
Assembly, DMV, and the legislative review committee-retains complete
control over the specialty license plate program.
299. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *12.
300. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the application of the "purpose" test has caused
confusion as to what statutes violate the Establishment Clause); United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
301. See, e.g., McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that the
displays of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky courthouses did not have a
secular purpose and thus violated the Establishment Clause); Edwards, 482
U.S. 578 (holding that the Louisiana statute permitting the teaching of
evolution only if creationism was also taught had a religious purpose); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (noting that the purpose of a Kentucky statute
requiring that the Ten Commandments be posted on the walls of all
classrooms in the state was religious); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (noting Arkansas' rationale for a statute prohibiting teaching evolution
in public schools).
implicated. Post-Summum, courts cannot simply rely on the facially
religious nature of the speech-i.e., "the very appearance of the
plate" -when resolving an Establishment Clause challenge because
the government's reasons for accepting a monument may differ
significantly from the meaning that a donor or observer ascribes to
the monument. Instead of focusing on the words or symbols used,
the control test requires courts to evaluate the government's intent.
The district court's reasoning in Summers, therefore, is
inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Van Orden and Summum.
To the extent that the district court considers legislative intent at
all, it looks at only those "religious" comments that certain
sponsoring legislators made without considering possible secular
reasons that these or other legislators had for adopting the "I
Believe" plate.:" For example, the court cited to newspaper
reports relating to three South Carolina legislators, one of whom
allegedly said that he would not support a specialty plate for Islam,
another that he did not consider Wicca a religion, and the third that
he "would be very uncomfortable" with a Scientology plate.3 3
While it may be relevant that a specific legislator would or would
not support a specialty license plate for other religions, it is not
dispositive under Summum. Even if true, these statements do not,
by themselves, give insight into the legislators' answers to the
underlying question as to why each legislator would not support
such specialty plates. Each of the officials or the legislature as a
whole might reject other religious plates because the allegedly
"disfavored" religions do not have a strong connection to the
history of the State or fail to meet other secular criteria.
Under Summum, though, the type of reason-secular or
religious-makes a constitutional difference when evaluating the
impact of the Establishment Clause on facially religious
government speech. If the evidence shows that the South Carolina
legislature approved the "I Believe" plate for the purpose of
advancing mainstream Christianity over other religions, then there
would be an Establishment Clause violation. On the other hand, if
certain legislators or the legislature as a whole approved the "I
302. See Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *12.
303. Id. at *12 n.24.
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Believe" plate for non-religious reasons-e.g., a tribute to the
historical or cultural role that Christianity played in the State-
then, as with Ten Commandments monuments on the Texas
Capitol grounds, the decision to accept and display the religiously
themed specialty plate would not violate the Establishment
Clause.3 With respect to the "I Believe" license plate, then, the
South Carolina legislature may issue a license plate relating directly
to the religious beliefs of some of its citizens under the plurality's
view in Van Orden provided there is some historical significance (or
other secular, non-religious) purpose. As in McCreary and Van
Orden, the outcome will vary with the particular facts of each case.
Alternatively, even if the endorsement test applies to
government speech, there is reason to think that the "I Believe"
license plate is constitutional. The defendants argued
(unsuccessfully) that, because the "I Believe" plate is one of more
than 110 specialty plates available to South Carolina motorists, a
reasonable observer, who is aware of the specialty program, would
know that South Carolina offers a variety of specialty plates and is
not promoting "I Believe" as its only (and singularly religious)
message. °5 In rejecting this view, the district court emphasized that
South Carolina offered at most two religious plates-the "I
Believe" plate and the "In Reason We Trust" plate. The court
discounts the latter because (i) the "In Reason We Trust" plate is
not readily traceable to the Secular Humanists, and (ii) it was
approved through the DMV process (although given that the
legislative review committee retains veto power over all plates, it is
not clear why this is significant). The district court discounts the
"In God We Trust" plate because, under the Supreme Court's
precedent, the national motto lacks religious content. Thus,
because there are no other overtly religious plates, the district court
contends that the government is endorsing Christianity.
304. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1140
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that in Van Orden "all the Justices
agreed that government speech was at issue, but the Establishment Clause
argument was nonetheless rejected . . . because [for the plurality] the Ten
Commandments 'have an undeniably historical meaning' in addition to their
,religious significance."').
305. Summers, 2008 WL 5401537, at *13 n.25.
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Yet if the specialty plate program is subject to the
endorsement test, then a court must consider the entire program,
just as the Supreme Court considered the entire display in Lynch v.
Donnelly:
Although the religious and indeed sectarian
significance of the creche ... is not neutralized
by the setting, the overall holiday setting
changes what viewers may fairly understand to
be the purpose of the display-as a typical
museum setting, though not neutralizing the
religious content of a religious painting, negates
any message of endorsement of that content.""
Even if the "I Believe" plate is the only religious specialty plate,
that plate cannot be viewed in isolation. The reasonable observer
must consider the "I Believe" plate in the context of the specialty
program as a whole. And when considered in this light, the
reasonable observer may have a more difficult time deciding that
the overall message is one of endorsement that would violate the
Establishment Clause. As in Rosenberger, "[t]he governmental
program here is neutral toward religion. There is no suggestion
that the [government] created it to advance religion or adopted
some ingenious device with the purpose of aiding a religious
cause." 3 7 There is no evidence mentioned in the district court's
opinion that in approving the "I Believe" specialty plate the
legislators who proposed that plate, let alone the entire South
Carolina legislature, conveyed a message of endorsement.
Moreover, the "I Believe" plate is only one out of more than 110
specialty plates that South Carolina offers. The number and variety
of specialty plates are similar to the "17 monuments and 21
historical markers commemorating the 'people, ideals, and events
that compose Texan identity.' 31" Given the context in Van Orden,
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, holding that "[t]he
306. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
307. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
840 (1995).
308. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
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circumstances surrounding the display's placement on the capitol
grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended
the latter, nonreligious aspects of the tablets' message to
predominate."'3 9 And the same may be said for the "I Believe"
plate. "The widely divergent viewpoints of these many purveyors
of opinion, all supported on an equal basis by the [government],
significantly diminishes the danger that the message of any one
publication is perceived as endorsed by the [government].""' Thus,
given that the monument in Van Orden and the speech in
Rosenberger did not violate the endorsement test, a reasonable
observer may not view the "I Believe" plate in context as conveying
a message of endorsement.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of government speech under both the Free
Speech and Establishment Clauses has changed. And Summum is
the cause. Whereas prior to Summum the majority of circuits
required that a reasonable observer would be able to identify the
government as the speaker for the government speech doctrine to
apply, Summum looks to the level of control that the government
actually has over the speech. To know whether the government is
speaking post-Summum, courts must determine whether the
government controls the message. If the government has "final
approval authority" and exercises "effective[] control," then the
message is that of the government-regardless of (i) whom a
hypothetical observer (rightly or wrongly) thinks is speaking. and
(ii) how that observer interprets the government's message. As
Summum states, government speech-through monuments,
specialty license plates, or other expressive activities-"may in fact
be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways."3 2 Yet,
even though different interpretations of the government's message
are possible, its speech is not subject to scrutiny under the Free
309. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
310. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
311. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 564 n.7 (2005).
312. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009).
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Speech Clause. The government may convey the message that it
"view[s] as appropriate for the place in question, taking into
account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local
culture 31 3 and may discriminate based on viewpoint in the process.
Moreover, contrary to the district court's analysis in
Summers, the inquiry into whether facially religious government
speech violates the Free Speech Clause is not separate and distinct
from the Establishment Clause inquiry. To know which
Establishment Clause test to apply, the Court first must know
whether the government is speaking. If the government is the
speaker, then it may discriminate based on content and viewpoint
to make sure that its message gets out to the public. But given that
the government may engage in viewpoint discrimination when
speaking, a reasonable observer may rightly believe that the
government is not accounting for her particular religious viewpoint,
not because the government is promoting a religious message but
because either (i) the reasonable observer misinterpreted or
misunderstood the message or (ii) the government is intending to
send a secular, non-religious message that does not promote or
denigrate any person's religious perspective. Provided that it is not
acting with a primarily religious purpose, the government may
engage in facially religious speech without violating the
Establishment Clause regardless of the effect of that speech on a
reasonable observer. That a reasonable observer may feel
disaffected by facially religious government speech does not show
that what the government intended to say violated the Establishment
Clause; it shows only that the message had a certain effect on the
observer. This is not to say that a viewer is not without recourse,
though. As with other types of government speech, if a listener
does not agree with or like the government speech, that person may
resort to the political process to vote for new legislators who may
reflect more closely that person's views.31 4 Thus, under Summum,
313. Id. at 1134.
314. Id. at 1132 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)) ("And of course, a government entity is
ultimately 'accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy."').
412 [Vol. 8
2010] LICENSING RELIGIOUS GOV'T SPEECH 413
federal and state governments have more freedom to engage in
facially religious speech and, when doing so, may safely exhale-at
least until the next election.
